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Nova Scotia1

I. Introduction

The past two years have been a fruitful time for those in Nova Scotia
interested in labour law. During this period, the Supreme Court of
Canada has handed down several decisions of relevance in this
province, while the Nova Scotia Supreme Court itself has had cause
to decide issues of considerable significance. Even more important,
the number of written decisions published by the Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board has increased somewhat, with the result
that some detail as to the day to day practice of the Board and its
interpretation of the Act is now available. This comment will review
as many of the new authorities as is possible in an attempt to provide
an indication of the current legal status of labour relations in Nova
2
Scotia. For the most part these cases involve the Trade Union Act.
However, it must be remembered that the common law does have an
impact on labour relations and accordingly several such decisions
are discussed.
II. ConstitutionalIssues

The question of whether a provincial Labour Relations Board has
jurisdiction over a particular group of employees has not caused too
many problems in Nova Scotia. Apart from the decision of the
Supreme Court in J. P. Porter Co. v. Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of Canada, Local 133 the matter

does not appear to have been judicially considered in recent years.
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This is in sharp contrast to many other parts of the country where
4
cases have been arising with some frequency before various Courts
and Labour Relations Boards. 5 In light of the absence of local
jurisprudence, two decisions, one by the Supreme Court of Canada
and another by the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board, should be
commented on.
The unanimous conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of
Canada in CNR v. Canada Labour Relations Board & Canadian
Brotherhood of Transport and General Workers 6 that provincial

labour legislation applied to employees of Jasper Park Lodge was
hardly surprising. Jasper Park Lodge is located on an area of land
leased by the CNR from the federal government and is part of a
national park. The Lodge, which is owned by CNR in its own right,
is part of the hotel complex that the company is authorized to carry
on under its charter and is not restricted to, indeed, appears to have
very little connection with, passengers travelling on the CNR
railway system. The appellant CBRT had applied to the CLRB in
1970 for certification as bargaining agents for a unit of employees
employed at the Lodge. The Board rejected the challenge by CNR
to its jurisdiction on the grounds that the Alberta labour relations
8
legislation 7 applied to such employees and duly certified the union.
On eventual appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the decision of
4. For example see Re British Columbia Packers Ltd. and British Columbia
Council United Fishermen and Allied Workers (1975), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 602; 75
C.L.L.C. 14,307 (F.C., T.D.); Re Field Aviation Co. and InternationalAssociation
of Machinists and Aerospace, Local Lodge 1579 (1975), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 234;
[1974] 6 W.W.R. 596 (Alta. S.C., A.D.); Re Pacific Produce Delivery and
Warehouse Ltd. and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580
(1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 130; [1974] 3 W.W.R. 389 (B.C.C.A.); Re City of
Kelowna and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 338 (1974), 42 D.L.R.
(3d) 754 (B.C.S.C.).
5. For example, see Local Union 800 of the United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and
Canada and Yellow Jacket Welding Company Ltd., [1975] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R.
244 (C.L.R.B.); Canadian Telephone and Suppy Ltd. and B.C. Telephone
Supervisors Association, [1975] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 358 (B.C.L.R.B.)
Teamsters International Union, Local 990 and North Shore Supply Company Ltd.,
[1975] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 28 (O.L.R.B.); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 91 and Other Freightways Ltd., [1975] 1 Canadian
L.R.B.R. 378 (O.L.R.B.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Local
580 and Cowichan Co-operative Services Farm Supply Centre and Melogram
Milling Co., [1975] 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 70 (B.C.L.R.B.).
6. [1974] 1 N.R. 547;45 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.).
7. Id. at 549; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 3.
8. id.
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the Appellate Division of the Alberta Supreme Court9 quashing the
certification was upheld in a judgment delivered by the Chief
Justice.
In the Supreme Court counsel for the appellants relied on two
arguments. The CLRB submitted that the employees fell within the
scope of s. 53(g) of the Industrial Relations & Disputes and
Investigation Act 10 as being the subject of the federal declaratory
power by virtue of s. 18(1) of the Canadian National Railways
Act. 11 The CBRT, supported by the Board, argued that s. 54 of the
IRDI Act justified the Board's certification in that the CNR was
wholly-owned by the federal government and had thus been
established to perform the function, inter alia, of operating Jasper
Park Lodge on behalf of the Government of Canada. 12
The submission of the CLRB was shortly dealt with by the Chief
Justice. Counsel's argument rested on the premise that the Lodge
fell within the phrase 'other transportation works' in s. 18 of the
CanadianNationalRailways Act. In the words of Laskin C.J.:
• . .[W]hat is left is consideration of the question whether the
power to acquire and operate hotels, which the respondent may
find to be necessary and convenient for the purposes of its
railway system, warrants this Court in saying that a hotel so
acquired, and being a hotel of the character of Jasper Park Lodge,
falls within the words "other transportation works". 13
His Lordship answered this question in the negative. While the
empowering Act permitted the CNR to acquire inter alia, hotels as
it found it "necessary and convenient for the purposes of National
Railways", 14 to have concluded that this automatically brought any
hotels within the scope of "other transportation works" would have
meant that any properties that CNR acquired pursuant to such power
would fall within the federal jurisdiction. This would be the case
even though the property was in fact not incidentally connected with
the railway system. 15 Laskin C.J. felt the argument was
9. Re Canadian National Railway Co. and Canadian Brotherhood of Railway,
Transport and General Workers (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 119; [1973] 2 W.W.R.
700 (Alta. S.C., A.D.).
10. R.S.C. 1952, c. 152 (hereinafter IRDI Act) (now s. 108 Part V. of the Canada
Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.L-1).
11. S.C. 1955, c. 29 (now R.S.C. 1970, c.C-10).
12. [1974] 1 N.R. 547 at 553; 45 D.L.R. (3d) I at 6.
13. Id. at 552; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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"untenable". 16
The contention by counsel for the CBRT based on s. 54 of the
IRDI Act caused the Chief Justice a little more difficulty. Laskin
C.J. traced the history of the CNR briefly and examined the
financial and shareholding structure of the company. He concluded
that "the ownership and control in the Crown and in the federal
Government under legislation of Parliament is thus abundantly
evident."'17 Nevertheless, he found that Jasper Park Lodge was not
run "on behalf of" the Government of Canada.
His Lordship approached this issue on the basis that the words "on
behalf of" were words of agency 18 and was clearly influenced in his
decision that an agency relationship did not exist by the somewhat
surprising concession by counsel for the appellants to this effect. 19
However, Laskin C.J. also supported his conclusion by reference to
the Financial Administration Act 20 and the Canadian National
Railway Act. 2 1 The former described the CNR as a "proprietary
company ' 2 2 as distinct from an "agency corporation". 23 His
Lordship decided that while this was not determinative of the status
of a Crown Corporation, in the absence of any express provision in
the applicable legislation creating an agency relationship the
disclaimer of the existence of an agency by the CLRB was
reinforced. 24 Accordingly, since the Canadian National Railways
Act, unlike several other statutes, 25 did not expressly create such a
relationship the CNR did not fall within the scope of s. 54.
Presumably, the decision in the present case will make it
extremely difficult to argue that crown corporations fall within s. 54
of the IRDI Act in the future. While in subsequent cases counsel
may make their position easier by not disclaiming the existence of
an agency, it would seem that Laskin C.J.'s uncharacteristically
technical approach to the issue would preclude many alternative
findings. To this end, it is unfortunate that the Chief Justice
constrained himself to the strictness of legislative language and did
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 553; 45
Id. at 554; 45
Id. at 553; 45
R.S.C. 1970,

D.L.R. (3d) at 7.
D.L.R. (3d) at 8.
D.L.R. (3d) at 7.
c. F-10.

21. S.C. 1955, c. 29.
22. [1974] 1 N.R. 547 at 555; 45 D.L.R. (3d) I at 8.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.at 556; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 9.
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not adopt a more realistic analysis of the relationship between the
parties. Nevertheless, having regard to the inherent reluctance of the
Courts to pierce the corporate veil by finding a dependent
relationship, particularly between the Crown and a corporation, his
Lordship's conclusion appears correct.
It should not be concluded, on the other hand, that every hotel run
by CNR or CPR will automatically fall within the provincial
jurisdiction as a result of this decision. The Supreme Court did not
have to consider the effect of s. 53(b) 26 of the IRDI Act as counsel
no doubt felt the matter was precluded by the decision of the Privy
Council in CPR v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (The
Empress Hotel Case).27 Nevertheless, there would appear no reason
why this case and the present decision might not be distinguished in
appropriate circumstances.
Consider, for example, the case of the Hotel Nova Scotian in
Halifax. Unlike both the Empress Hotel in Victoria and Jasper Park
Lodge this is situated directly over the railway station and to this
extent is an integral part of the railway operation. While physical
proximity is obviously not an adequate criterion in itself, it is
arguable that when first established the Nova Scotian was primarily
intended to accommodate those travelling on the railway system and
not primarily as a tourist resort or a hotel for the general public. The
question remains whether the fact that the hotel is open to the public
at large should be determinative of jurisdiction. Apparently Laskin
C.J. would think so, at least in the context of s. 53 of the IRDI
Act. 28 The response of the Privy Council in CPR v.
Attorney-General of British Columbia is not, however, quite so
restrictive:
It may be that, if the appellant chose to conduct a hotel solely or
even principally for the benefit of travellers on its system, the
hotel would be a part of its railway undertaking. Their Lordships
do not doubt that the provision of meals and rest for travellers on
26. Section 53:
Part I applies in respect of employees who are employed upon or in connection
with the operation of any work, undertaking or business that is within the
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada, including, but not so as to
restrict the generality of the foregoing,

(b) railways, canals, telegraphs and other works and undertakings connecting a
province with any other or others of the provinces, or extending beyond the
limits of a province.

27. [1950]A.C. 122; [1950] 1 D.L.R. 721 (P.C.) (Can.).
28. [1974] 1 N.R. 547 at 549; 45 D.L.R. (3d) I at 3.

796 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the appellant's system may be a part of its railway undertaking
whether that provision is made on 29trains or at stations and such
provision might be made at a hotel.
Here the Council was prepared to look for a principal 'rationale'.
With respect, this appears to be the preferable approach. The basic
question should be whether the hotel is an integral part of the
railway operation or whether it is just a separate business which is
convenient and advantageously placed for the transportation
system. Such factors as the nature of the people staying at the hotel
i.e. their mode of travel, or service arrangements in the hotel i.e.
whether a special attempt to accommodate train travellers is made,
might be indicative of what side of the line a particular case fell.
Based on these criteria, the Nova Scotian may be a bad example.
Nonetheless, the question of jurisdiction in this context is by no
means a dead issue.
The problem before the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board in
Bread, Cake, Biscuit, Crackers, Candy, Confectionary & Miscellaneous Workers' Union, Local 446 & Machine Warehousing &
Transport Co. 30 was both argued and resolved on more traditional
grounds. At issue was whether employees employed in the
company's warehousing and distribution division fell within the
legislative jurisdiction of the federal Parliament and thus outside
that of the Nova Scotia Board on the basis that it was part of an
interprovincial undertaking within s. 92 of the British North
America Act. 31
The company had two operations at its location in Dartmouth.
One was the moving and storage division which naturally was
involved in business throughout the country and across provincial
boundaries. The Board was of the opinion that this operation fell
within the jurisdiction of the federal Government. The second
operation involved the warehousing and distribution of goods
unconnected with the moving division. Having made the finding
that the two divisions were not, from a constitutional point of view,
integral parts of the same operation, the Board accepted jurisdiction
over such employees.
Several points might be made about this decision. First, the
Board held that the warehousing and distribution operation did not
29. [1950]A.C. 122at 144; [1950] 1 D.L.R. 721 at 732.
30. L.R.B. No. 2173.
31. R.S.C. 1970, App. No. 5.
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have a "federal aspect" merely because it made some shipments
across provincial boundaries by common carrier. This conclusion is
consistent with earlier jurisprudence 3 2 developed especially by the
Ontario Courts and Boards to the effect that if the primary business
in question is not that of a common carrier, the question of
jurisdiction will depend on whether the transportation operation was
an integral part of the primary business. Had the interprovincial
shipments been made on a regular, albeit infrequent, basis on the
employer's own vehicles rather than by common carrier, a contrary
finding might well have resulted.
Second, it is important to recognize that the warehousing and
distribution operation handled goods distinct from those in the
moving and storage division. In this way the Board was able to
separate the operation. Had this not been so, the employees must
have been regarded as part of a federal undertaking. The case would
have been indistinguishable from those involving truck drivers who
pick up mail, 33 mechanics maintaining trucks used in interprovincial carrier work, 34 or stevedores who load ships. 35 All are
integrally connected with a federal operation.
Finally, it must be assumed that there was no integration of
employees in the two operations in question. No doubt the
movement of a minimal number of employees from division to
division would not have proved fatal to the question of jurisdiction.
However, it is submitted that had there been evidence that
employees frequently worked in both operations the Board would
have had no option but to refuse jurisdiction over any of the
company's employees.
III. Certification
Without doubt the certification procedure set out in s. 24 of the
32. R. v. Toronto Magistrates,Ex Parte Tank Truck TransportLtd., [1960] O.R.
497; 25 D.L.R. (2d) 16 (H.C.), affd [1963] 1 O.R. 272; 36 D.L.R. (2d) 497
(C.A.); R. v. Cooksville Magistrates Court, Ex ParteLiquid Cargo Lines Ltd.,
[1965] 1 O.R. 84; 46 D.L.R. (2d) 700 (H.C.); HWR ForwardingLtd., O.L.R.B.,
March 1970, 1450.
33. Letter Carriers Union of Canada v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers and
M. & B. Enterprises, [1974] 1 W.W.R. 452; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 105 (S.C.C).
34. Arrow Transfer Company and CanadianAssociation ofIndustrial, Mechanical
& Skilled Workers, and General Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 31, [1974] 1
Canadian L.R.B.R. 29 (B.C.L.R.B.).
35. The Eastern CanadaStevedoring Case, [1955] S.C.R. 529; [1955] 3 D.L.R.

721.
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Trade Union Act has produced more problems for the Labour
Relations Board than the remainder of the Act put together. For the
most part the controversy has centered around the issue of
certification without a vote under s. 24(2) (c) 3 6 and the relevance of
petitions filed by intervening employees. The latest steps in this
saga have been the decision of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court in the Schwarz case 37 and the Board's new policy of
prehearing votes. 3 8 Section 24, however, contains several subsidiary points which are of some importance and which the Board
has had cause to comment on recently. Before turning to the
question of certification and votes it is, therefore, intended to
mention two other issues.
The first concerns the obligation of the Board to find under s.
24(2) that a specified number of employees in a unit "are members
in good standing". The Regulations 3 9 governing the procedure of
the Board define "member in good standing" as a person who at the
date of application for certification has joined or signed an application
for membership in the applicant trade union and has paid, on his
own behalf, at least $2.00 to the union in union fees within the
prescribed time limits. 40 While this requirement is readily satisfied
and causes few problems, it is important for the Board to ensure that
those who sign a union card and pay the $2.00 do so as part of a
genuine desire to become union members. Just as it is important that
the Board protects employees from employer influences, so should
union pressure and chicanery be effectively dealt with.
The clear cases of union coercion can usually be dealt with under
the unfair labour practices provisions of the Act 41 or the use of the
36. Section 24(2):

When, pursuant to an application for certification under this Act by a trade
union, the Board has determined that a unit of employees is appropriate for
collective bargaining
(c) notwithstanding clause (b) hereof, if the Board is satisfied that the applicant
trade union has as members in good standing more than fifty percent of the
employees in the appropriate unit and the Board is satisfied that. no useful
purpose will be served by conducting a vote among the employees in the unit, it

may certify the trade union as the bargaining agent of the employees in the unit.
37. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606(S.C., A.D.).
38. Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board Policy Statement, June, 1975.
39. See generally, Regulations Pursuant to the Trade Union Act, proclaimed

October, 1972.
40. Id. at Regulation 10.
41. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, ss. 51-56.
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Board's discretion not to certify. 42 Less obvious techniques of
signing up doubting members, including those carried out in good
faith, present a more difficult problem. To this end, the "policy
statement" of the Board in Retail Clerks InternationalAssoc'tation
and Dominion Stores Ltd. 4 3 is a very important indication of Board
practice. In this case one employee, claimed as a member of the
union, testified that he had never paid the $2.00 required under the
Regulations. The Board was not satisfied that this fact was known
by responsible union officials. However, it was established that
several "keys" had adopted the practice of not collecting the $2.00
from employees at the time of signing but they would collect it later.
In fact, the "key" actually paid the money to the union and, with
one exception, collected it from the employee at a later date.
The Board found that this practice did not satisfy the requirement
of Regulation 10 that the $2.00 fee be paid by an employee "on his
own behalf". While the Board held that on this occasion the
practice would not mean the dismissal of the application for
certification, 44 the decision makes it clear that strict standards will
be applied in the future. The Board stated that their policy was to
distinguish between two situations:
Where it is established that, unknown to union officials, proper
payment has not been made in respect of persons claimed as
members of the union, those persons are simply not counted as
members. On the other hand, where it is established that the
union officials who signed the affidavit knew or should have
known that the $2.00 was not properly paid the matter is much
more serious. The application will be rejected outright because
knowingly
signing a false affidavit is to commit a fraud on the
45
Board.

At first sight this statement may appear very harsh. However, the
distinction drawn is consistent with jurisprudence developed by the
Ontario Labour Relations Board and is backed by very strong policy
reasons. Regulation 10 appears to be the only practical means by
42. Id. at s. 24(3). See, however, infra, at note 49.
43. L.R.B. No. 2155.
44. Id. at 3. The rationale for the Board's approach in the instant case lies in the
fact that most union officials appeared to think this was a legitimate method of
enlisting support.
45. Id. It appears basic to the Dominion Stores case that the $2.00 was lent by the
person signing up members. Quaere what the approach of the Board would be in a
case where a fellow employee not involved in the membership drive lent the $2.00
to a prospective member. Apart from the problems of proof, there would seem to be
nothing wrong with this provided that the borrower repays the money.
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which the Board can judge the number of "members in good
standing". 46 The receipts and affidavits accompanying the union's
application are prepared by the union and relied on as prima facie
proof of the stated number of members. Accordingly, the possibility
for abuse is very real and the Board must adhere strictly to the
requirements of Regulation 10 insofar as they provide for an
indication of the real wishes of the employees. Moreover, in that the
Board would find it impossible to examine every union member
about his application to join the union, it has to rely heavily on the
integrity of those claiming the membership. Non-disclosure by a
responsible union official should therefore be fatal to the application
since the Board would not know the incidence of improper
membership and the whole application will be tainted.
The second decision of interest arose in Nova Scotia Government
Employees Association and the Izaak Walton Killam Hospital for
Children.4 7 Briefly, the facts were that the Association applied for
certification of a group of employees who were not eligible for
membership under the constitution establishing the organization.
The Board, following recent Ontario practice, 48 accordingly
exercised its discretion 49 and rejected the application.
It must be stressed that the union constitution involved here was
incorporated in a statute. 50 There is no reason to suppose that the
Board policy with respect to normal constitutions would be any
46. It should be noted that it is the fraud on the Board which leads to the severe

result in such cases. If there is a technical breach of the Act which is disclosed to
the Board at the time of the hearing there would seem to be no reason for rejection
of the union application in the absence of evidence of widespread use of the
practice. In such a situation the improperly obtained memberships should simply be
disregarded. See the practice of the Board in Retail Clerks International
Association andDominion Stores Ltd. L.R.B. No. 2169, affd in Dominion Stores
Ltd. v. LabourRelations Board (N.S.), S.H. No. 08072 at 28.

47. L.R.B. No. 2116.
48. CSAO National and Oakville Trafalgar Memorial Hospital Association and
Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1972] 1 O.R. 609: 23 D.L.R. (3d) 649; 72
C.L.L.C. para. 14, 118 (C.A.).

49. While the Board does not state from where it derives this discretion, it appears
reasonably clear that the word "may" in s. 24(3) of the Trade Union Act is being
relied upon. Without wishing to become involved in a lengthy discussion, it does
appear to the writers that this discretion may only be utilized after a vote of the
employees has been taken and not as the Board pleases. Thus, in the instant case, it
would seem a strong argument could be mounted that the Board was acting in
excess of its jurisdiction.
50. The Act involved was An Act to Incorporate the Nova Scotia Government
Employees Association, S.N.S. 1973, c. 136.
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different from that formerly adopted 51 by the Ontario Board which
is to look at the admission practices of the union. If, despite the
technical ineligibility of certain employees under the constitution,
the practice of the union has been to admit such employees, the
Board would not be bound by the constitutional language. Only
where the practice of the union had been to apply the constitution
strictly in the past would the Board refuse to certify. The refusal, of
course, was based on the premise that a union should not be
certified for a unit of employees unless all the employees concerned
could be members of the union. 52 Otherwise, proper representation
by the union of all the employees' wishes could not be guaranteed.
Assuming that this is indeed the policy of the Nova Scotia Board,
and there is no reason to suspect otherwise, it is interesting to
compare it with the decision of the Construction Industry Panel 53 in
the first application for accreditation54 by the Construction
Association Management Labour Bureau Ltd.. Under s. 94(3) of the
Trade Union Act the Panel, even where it concludes that the
applicant organization has satisfied all other requirements of the
accreditation procedure, has a discretion in deciding whether to
accredit. 55 In the course of refusing to grant the accreditation
application in this case the Board stated:
We note that in the exercise of this discretion the Panel would be
reluctant to accredit an employers' organization to bargain on
behalf of any employer 6who could not, if he wished, join the
accredited organization. 5
51. For example, see, InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers, Local 796 and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (1967), 67 C.L.L.C. para. 16,026;
Campbell Reproductions Ltd., [1971] O.L.R.B.R. 134; Dufferin-Peel County
Roman Catholic Public School Board, [1971] O.L.R.B.R. 680; 400 University
Prospect Company, [1972] O.L.R.B.R. 110. For the Ontario Labour Relations
Board's more recent practice see CSAO Nationaland Oakville TralfalgarMemorial
Hospital Association and Ontario Labour Relations Board, supra, note 48 and
Carpenters and Joiners, Local 2679 and Maine Lumber Company, [1973]
O.L.R.B.R. 40.
52. "Members of the union" presumably meaningfull members of the union with
all rights attached thereto. For Ontario jurisprudence see the CSAO and Maine
Lumber cases, id.
53. See Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 91.
54. L.R.B. No. 293c.
55. Supra, note 53, s. 94(3):
Where in an application for accreditation the Panel is satisfied either .... the
Panel may accredit the employees' organization as the sole bargaining agent to
bargain for all unionized employers in the area and sector.
56. Supra, note 54.
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Here, the Panel appears to be saying that if the practice was to
refuse membership the discretion not to accredit would be
exercised. Later in the decision, however, the Board rejected
counsel's argument to the effect that by virtue of s. 90(2) any such
provision would be null and void and proceeded to restate the
proposition much more forcefully:
In summary on this point, the Panel will be reluctant to accredit
an employer's organization which on the face of its constitutional
documents denies membership to any employers for whom it
would bargain after accreditation. 57
On the face of it, this statement would appear in conflict with the
policy suggested supra, and it might appear that there was one rule
for unions and another for employer organizations. However, the
two situations may be distinguished. First, it is important to note that
the Board practice with respect to unions is based on past practice.
In the case of the Management Labour Bureau there was, of course,
no past practice. Secondly, while in the case of a well-established
union the Board might be able to accept a commitment from the
union to adopt a liberal eligibility practice, in the circumstances of
the present application one can understand the Board being reluctant
to adopt this course. Accreditation would give the employer's
organization the power to bargain not just on behalf of one plant but
all the unionized employers in the commercial and industrial sector
of the Construction Industry. 5 8 It was, therefore, vital to ensure that
the power was exercised under the auspices of all of those
employers. This particularly is so where the whole accreditation
process up to the date of the hearing had made it clear that there
were numerous potential personal conflicts between employers
covered by the application. 59 Proper representation had to be
ensured. The case does not, therefore, stand as authority for a strict
eligibility approach in the case of unions.
As commented earlier, it is the question of the relevance of
petitions to the certification process that has caused the most
57. Id.
58. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 94(1).
59. See Boilermaker Contractors Association case, L.R.B. No. 333c and
Canadian Automatic Sprinkler Association case, L.R.B. No. 332c. These cases

were heard together in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court on application for review as
CanadianAutomatic Sprinkler Association v. Labour Relations Board (N.S.), S.H.
No. 05071 and Boilermaker Contractors Association v. Labour Relations Board

(N.S.) (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 36 (S.C., T.D.).
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perplexing problems in the area. When the revised Act came into
force in 1972, s. 24(2) effected a major change in the legislative
power of the Board to deal with certification applications. 60 The
section provides that the Board must dismiss the application if the
union cannot prove to the Board's satisfaction that 40% of the
employees in the unit are members in good standing. 6 1 If the Board
is satisfied that more than 40% but less than 60% are members in
good standing a vote "shall" be ordered. 62 However, s. 24(2) (c)
provides that:
If the Board is satisfied that the applicant trade union has as
members in good standing more than 50% of the employees in
the appropriate unit and the Board is satisfied that no useful
purpose will be served by conducting a vote among the
employees in the unit, it may certify the trade union as the
bargaining agent of the employees in the unit.
This provision was clearly designed, inter alia,63 to permit the
Board to take into account the effect of employer influence and
interference in the formation of the union. In other words, where the
Board felt that owing to such factors there could be no certainty that
the employees would vote freely and express their true wishes, they
could certify without a vote. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Aerovox
Canada Ltd. v. IBEW Local 625 and the Nova Scotia Labour
Relations Board,64 W.H. Schwartz & Sons Ltd. v. Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board and Bread, Cake, Biscuit, Crackers,
Confectionary & Miscellaneous Workers' Union, Local 441,65 and
Dominion Stores Ltd. v. LabourRelations Board(N.S.), 66 the exact
meaning of the subsection is still quite unclear.
In the Aerovox case the Board had certified 6 7 the respondent
union without a vote, deciding that no useful purpose in determining
the employees' true wishes would be served in taking a vote. The
applicant sought an order in the nature of certiorarito quash the
60. See formerly, Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 311, s. 9.
61. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 24(2) (a).

62. Id. at s. 24(2) (b).
63. Presumably, this section is also designed to permit the Board to take the
unions' numerical strength into account and thus to certify without a vote where the
union has over 60% of employees in the unit as its members and all else is in order.
64. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 55 (S.C., A.D.).
65. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606 (S.C., A.D.).

66. S.H. No. 07063.
67. On December 10, 1974.
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award on the basis that the Board should have ordered a vote. In the
Trial Division, Hart J. dismissed the application, concluding that
the Board had jurisdiction to decide that question. An appeal to the
Appellate Division was unsuccessful.
In giving judgment for the Appellate Division, MacKeigan C.J.
N.S. directed his enquiry to one point; the fact that there were no
petitions filed by any of the employees in the unit under Regulation
2.68 This reads as follows:
(1) In considering whether any useful purpose will be served by
conducting a vote among the employees under s. 24 of the Act
the Board shall have regard only to evidence as to the true wishes
of the employees, expressed by petition filed not later than the
terminal date fixed in accordance with subsection (2).
(2)...
(3) For purposes of this section, a petition is any evidence in
writing of an honest and voluntary statement by an employee or
employees either that they wish to be represented by the applicant
trade union or that they no longer wish to be represented by the
applicant trade union provided the Board is satisfied that it has
been
(a) signed by each employee so signifying and
(b) supported by oral testimony in the personal knowledge and
observation of the witness as to the origination of the petition
and the manner in which each signature was obtained.
The Chief Justice simply concluded that since there were no
petitions filed the Board had "no basis . . . to consider whether a

vote should be held." 69 Accordingly, it had the "sole discretion"
to decide the question it did and was acting "fully within its
jurisdiction.' '70
The writers agree with this conclusion insofar as it permits the
Board to exercise the power they have been specifically granted
under s. 24(2) (c) and thus, to this extent, is a realistic recognition
of the latter's role under the Act. One wonders, however, how his
Lordship reached the conclusion that the Board had the power to
exercise its discretion when he had expressly found there was no
basis on which to do so. On a literal reading of s. 24(2) as a whole,
the presumption would appear to be that a vote shall be ordered
unless the Board exercises its discretion under s. 24(2) (c). 71 If,
68. This regulation became effective December 7, 1973.
69. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 55 at 58.
70. Id. at 58.
71. This is particularly the case where the union has between 50% and 60%
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then, there is no basis for exercising the discretion surely a vote
should be held?
Despite these logical difficulties, the decision is a satisfactory one
from a purely industrial relations perspective. A hint of thihgs to
come was evidenced, however, in a passage in which the Chief
Justice demonstrated just how strictly he was likely to construe
Regulation 2:
The Board is required by Regulation 2(1) to consider only
petitions of employees in determining 72whether any useful
purpose would be served in holding a vote.
The full effect of these words were soon to be realized in the
Schwartz decision.
In Schwartz73 the Board once again had certified the union
without a vote. 74 On this occasion, however, the Board expressly
stated that certain actions of the employer constituted interference
with the expression of the true wishes of the employees such that no
useful purpose would be served by conducting a vote. The acts
involved were the distribution to the employees by the employer of
a letter received from the latter's solicitor setting out how
employees could make their views as to certification known to the
Board. Accompanying the letter were three separate forms which
the employees could fill out and send to the Board as a petition;
many in fact did so. 75 Nonetheless, as stated, the Board certified
without a vote. An application for orders in the nature of certiorari
and mandamus quashing the order of the Board and requiring it to
order a vote of employees in the unit was dismissed by Hart J. in the
Trial Division. An appeal from that decision was, however, upheld
in the Appellate Division.
support. Once the support is over 60% the structure of s. 24(2) makes it difficult to
ascertain what the presumption should be.
72. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 55 at 58.
73. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606.
74. Id. at 608.
75. Id. at 611:
The Board had before it twenty-five letters which were prima facie 'petitions'
within the meaning of Regulation 2. Nineteen employees had written the Board
apparently on the form supplied by the employer, that they were not members of
the union and did not wish to be represented by it, and are shown on the record
as intervenors. Six other employees had sent in 'petitions' on another of the
employer's forms stating that they had joined the union but no longer wished to
be represented by it. Eight 'petitioners' gave evidence before the Board and
many, if not all, of the others attended the Board hearing and were available to
give evidence.
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The appellant's main contention was that in deciding the "no
useful purpose" issue on the basis of the employer's distribution of
his solicitor's material, the Board was applying an incorrect
construction of s. 24 (2) (c) and, in particular, failing to observe the
requirements of Regulation 2(1). 7 6 The Chief Justice agreed with
this submission. His Lordship found that the Board had not directed
itself to the proper question: i.e., whether the petitions were in fact
"honest and voluntary". Moreover, Regulation 2 instructed the
Board to take into account only petition evidence when considering
the use of its discretion under s. 24(2) (c). 77 By largely ignoring the
effect of the petitions and deciding the case on other factors the
Board had introduced legally irrelevant material and had thus
78
exceeded its jurisdiction.
There can be little doubt that the interpretation placed on
Regulation 2(1) by the Chief Justice runs quite contrary to the
"legislative intent" behind its enactment and the common belief by
management and labour as to its meaning. The regulation would
appear to be the final 7 9 attempt to nullify the potential of the
decision in Re Sobeys FoodstoresLtd. and Canada Food and Allied
Workers' Union, Local P-115780 to the effect that the Board might
have been obliged to take into account any petitions received after
the date of application in deciding what the true wishes of the
employees were. 8 1 Thus, the intent of Regulation 2(1) was to
restrict the Board in ascertainingthe true wishes of the employees to
looking at petitions filed in the requisite manner. In no way was it
intended to restrict the Board's ability to consider other evidence
before it when in deciding whether any useful purpose would be
served in conducting a vote, it was considering matters other than
the true wishes of the employees.
Two points support this initial assessment of Regulation 2. First,
the current regulation was preceded by another regulation 82 which
expressly stated that the Board, in deciding whether no useful
76. Id. at 610-611.
77. Id. at 613.
78. Id. at 615-616.
79. It is understood that the government is presently working to develop a new
regulation to overcome the difficulties presented by this decision.
80. (1976), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 203; (1973).41 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (S.C., T.D.).
81. See I. Christie, Trade Union Certification: New Regulations (1974), 1 Nova
Scotia Law News (No. 1) 1 at 2 for a brief discussion as to the history of the
regulation.
82. The former regulation came into force on June 14, 1973 and was amended
December 7, 1973.
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purpose would be served in ordering a vote, was to have regard to
"honest and voluntary" petitions and any other evidence. The
writers are not aware of any attempt to change the general intent of
this regulation when it was amended save to eliminate its potential
effect of appearing to require a vote where even one "honest and
83
voluntary" petition was received.
Secondly, Regulation 2 specifically recognizes the existence of
Regulation 15(1). This provides that any 'person' who believes he
has an interest to be considered in connection with a certification
proceeding may file a notice of intervention. One might well ask
what the Board was supposed to do with any anti-employer
evidence received from the intervenors if they were not permitted to
take it into account in deciding the very issue that such evidence
would often be related to.
The supporters of MacKeigan C.J.'s decision will no doubt
answer that of course account may be had of the intervenor's
evidence; the Board may use it to assess the honest and voluntary
nature of the petitions. With respect, such an argument evidences a
somewhat superficial analysis of the potential effect of such a stand.
Two short illustrations should suffice to demonstrate this. In the
first example, assume a situation where there is a 52% membership
at the time of application and there are no petitions; here, of course,
the Board would normally order a vote. An intervenor testifies,
however, that a further 15% of the employees in the unit would have
joined the union but for illegal employer interference. Thus, the true
wishes of the employees are that nearly 70% desire the union and
there would, accordingly, be no reason to order a vote. Yet, in light
of Schwartz it appears the Board could not have regard to the
intervenor's evidence because it is not petition evidence nor
evidence going to the "honest and voluntary" nature thereof.
Presumably, the Board could hide behind Aerovox and say that even
ignoring the external evidence they were going to exercise their
discretion but this is hardly an appropriate manner for a
quasi-judicial tribunal to proceed. In other words, Schwartz breaks
down completely when there are no petitions.
Secondly, assume that there is an application with a 65%
membership but 10% file petitions withdrawing their support for the
union. The petitions are "honest and voluntary" and the Board is
well aware of the true wishes of the employees; a situation where a
83. Christie, supra, note 81 at 2.
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vote would normally be ordered. However, intervenors' evidence
shows to the Board's satisfaction that the employer, subsequent to
the filing of petition, has threatened to discipline any employee who
votes for the union. Surely, this is the typical situation when the
Board should exercise its discretion and certify without a vote? But,
once again, it would seem that this is impossible because the
evidence does not go to the "honest and voluntary" nature of the
petitions, nor it might be added, to the employees' true wishes. The
decision in Schwartz, then, does not contemplate the distinction
between ascertaining the employees' true wishes and determining
their ability to express those true wishes in a vote. Both of these
factors are valid and must be taken into account by the Board in
exercising their discretion under s. 24(2) (c); indeed, the latter will
often be the more important in cases of employer interference.
Accordingly, from a purely technical point of view, the best advice
an unscrupulous lawyer might give his client would be to delay any
pressure until after the petitions have been filed. Obviously, this is a
ludicrous situation.
For all this, it is easy to understand the Chief Justice's
interpretation of Regulation 2. There can be no doubt that his
Lordship's interpretation is grammatically correct. Any effort by the
Appellate Division to give effect to the legislative intent in
construing the regulation would be straining the language. This, it is
suggested, is the crunch issue. How far can you go in ignoring basic
principles of English in trying to apply the 'Golden Rule' principle
of interpretation and could MacKeigan C. J. have taken this
approach in the instant case? The writers consider an interpretation
consistent with the legislative intent is possible and could have been
justified by the Appellate Division but to a large extent this is the
result of our conception of the role of the courts in supervising the
activities of the Labour-Relations Boards. Others may draw the
opposite conclusion and it is this significant difference in perception
which probably accounts for the conclusion reached by David
Mullan elsewhere 84 in this journal; nor, we would admit, can the
latter's analysis be faulted in the final resort except in that he is not
prepared to stretch the concept of viable statutory interpretation far
enough. What is important is that the Chief Justice appears to have
failed to take the potential effect of his interpretation into account in
84. D. Mullan, Recent Developments in Nova Scotian Administrative Law (1976),
3 Dal. L.J. 870 at 881.
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making his decision and thus has foreclosed any opportunity to
balance the obvious difficulties against linguistic certainties. This
failure is not, with respect, justified even by a badly drafted
Regulation like the one in question.
An even more substantive criticism of his Lordship's decision is
his almost cursory dismissal of the respondent union's argument.
Counsel contended that the effect of the Board order was that the
petition had in fact been found by the Board not to be "honest and
voluntary". This would, of course, mean that there were no
petitions to consider and would have brought the case within
Aerovox. 85 MacKeigan C. J. refused to accept this interpretation of
the order on the basis that he could not:
I ..find a word in the Board's decision which [suggested]...
that it directed its attention to whether8 the
petitions were in fact
6
voluntary or the effect of the petitions.
In refusing to consider the substance of the Board's order and
instead concentrating on the technical wording, it is suggested that
the Appellate Division completely ignored the role of the Labour
Relations Board as constituted under the Trade Union Act. Surely
its job is to administer the legislation effectively and give substance
to provisions designed to promote peaceful collective bargaining
which includes as its basis the concept of certification. It can be
claimed that the Board order was badly drafted; 87 while the Board
was presumably proceeding on its interpretation of the regulation it
could have reasonably forseen the difficulties such an approach
would lead to and just possibly this may have been the time to
sacrifice the principle of proceeding in accordance with the
legislative intent and protect itself from review. On the other hand,
an administrative tribunal charged with the administration of a
statute should arguably not be forced into this position. Whatever
the responsibility of the Board, it is suggested that the Court would
not have strained the wording of the Board order to give it the effect
contended by the union. Nor would such a result have necessitated a
strained interpretation of Regulation 2. All that was required was
what has been described elsewhere as "sufficient judicial respect
85. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 55.

86. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606 at 613,
87. The words 'badly drafted' are used in the sense that it may have been possible
for the Board to refer in the order to the fact that it had found the petitions to be, for
example, involuntary. This more defensive approach would surely have made its
position a little more secure before the Courts.
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for the role and expertise of the Board". 88 It is apparent that on this
occasion such respect was distinctly lacking. 89
Even at this stage, it appeared as though there may be an "out"
for the Board on future occasions. It is implicit in the Chief Justice's
reasoning in Schwartz that the Board could have used non petition
evidence to assess whether the petitions were in fact "honest and
voluntary". Indeed, his Lordship specifically states that if the
Board makes such a determination and there is evidence to support
the finding, the Courts would have no right to review its decision. 90
The Chief Justice's view of what constitutes an involuntary petition
may not, however, provide much encouragement for the Board to
adopt this approach:
If the Board's decision can be construed, which I very much
doubt, as a finding that mere distribution of the solicitor's letter
and forms were per se an act which made involuntary any
petitions using such forms, such a contention would, in my
opinion, clearly be illogical and wrong. The mere fact that an
employee uses a form supplied by the employer does not prove
that the employee, in using that form letter, was necessarily not
expressing honestly and voluntarily his true wishes. Suspicion
may well arise in an employer-employee relationship that an
employee may, out of fear or out of desire to curry favour, do
what he thinks his employer may want him to do, even though
contrary to his true desire. Suspicion, however, is far short of
proof. 9 1
In fact, it appears that MacKeigan C.J. believes that an
employee's action must virtually amount to an unfair labour practice
before a petition would not be voluntary 92 and that, in the absence
of such a finding, where a material number of employees signed
anti-union petitions a vote should probably be ordered. 93 Moreover,
if a majority sign such petitions then it would seem that the Board
94
will certify without a vote at its peril.
88. Mullan, supra, note 84.
89. Compare the quotations infra, notes 116 and 117. Nor are the writers
encouraged by the more recent decision of Cowan C.J. in Dominion Stores v.
Labour Relations Board, S.H. 07063. In this case evidence of employer
interference was more extreme than in Schwartz and the transcript of the Board
hearing demonstrated that the Board did proceed to some extent in terms of
evaluating the "honest and voluntary" nature of the petitions. Despite these factors
Cowan C.J. simply applied Schwartz and quashed the Board order.
90. (1975), 12 N.S.R. 606 at 612.
91. Id. at 613.
92. Id. at 613-614.
93. Id. at 615.
94. Id.
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The writers' argument is not with the "numbers game" played by
the Chief Justice but with his Lordship's apparent equating of an
involuntary petition with an employer's unfair labour practice. With
respect, this approach is in accord with neither the policy or
terminology of the Act. In the case of unfair labour practices the
element of intent is expressly incorporated into the relevant
provisions. This is not at all surprising in that they are designed to
impose a fairly substantial penalty on the more flagrant employer
and union activities. There is no such requirement in Regulation 2
or s. 24(2) (c). The words used in the former are "honest and
voluntary"; the Board here is concerned with the state of mind of
the employee and it is not the motive of the employer but the effect
of his actions on the employees that is important. In a more general
sense, s. 24(2) (c) permits the Board to ensure that any vote will
represent the true wishes of the employees. Accordingly, the Board
concerns itself with an objective assessment of employer activity
and attempts to guage its likely effect on employee voting patterns.
In any one case, the facts that lead the Board to conclude that the
petitions were not "honest and voluntary" or that voting rights
might not be exercised freely, may or may not amount to an unfair
labour practice 95 and the Act does not require that they should.
In the case at bar, the Board found that the distribution of material
by the employer would likely have unduly influenced the
employees. It is submitted that there was sufficient evidence to
justify that conclusion. One might well ask, for example, why the
employer took the initial step of distributing the material when the
proper form sent out by the Board itself was displayed in an
appropriate place. Would this step not influence the employees or at
least convince them that their employer had a very real interest in
the certification application. This impression is reinforced when it is
realized that although the Board notice had been posted for three
days, no material petitions were received by the Board until after
the material had been distributed by the employer.
It will be interesting to see what the reaction of the Supreme
Court will be in future cases should the Board start deciding that
petitions are "involuntary". 96 In the meantime the only thing that
appears certain is that where there are no petitions the Board, so
long as it does not have regard to other evidence, can exercise their
95. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 51.
96. See Dominion Stores, supra, note 89.
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discretion under s. 24(2) (c) as intended. This, of course, is the
effect of combining Aerovox and Schwartz. Yet, even if the Board
has regard to the membership figures, is this not having regard to
extrinsic evidence? The answer in Aerovox would appear to be no.
Accordingly, the Board can play a "numbers game" but that is
about all.
Fortunately, it appears that the number of petitions in future cases
may well become few and far between as a result of the Board's
97
recent policy statement adopting the concept of pre-hearing votes
and yet another regulation. Regulation 2(2) (a) was amended on
May 23, 1975 to read:
Upon the filing of an application for certification the Chief
Executive Officer shall:
(a) fix the terminal date...
Since the pre-hearing vote will normally be held five days after the
application for certification and only three days after the employer
has received notice, and the terminal date will be set before the date
of the pre-hearing vote, it is likely that the opportunities for
petitions are going to be minimal. If a substantial number do
materialize during the available short period, the Board's suspicions
could be justifiably aroused as to why, less than three days after the
peak of an organizing campaign, so many union members changed
their mind. While this is not a particularly satisfactory way of
improving the present situation 98 at least it may avoid the confusion
engendered by Schwartz and Aerovox. Obviously, if the present
Regulation 2 does not on its clear wording accord with legislative
intent the provision should be amended. Till then, the current state
of the law is very much up in the air.
Two final points might be made. First, one has to wonder what all
this confusion about certification is about. It is time consuming and
costly and potentially destructive of the Trade Union Act and the
97. Policy Statement of the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board, June 1975.
98. Over the past months there has been considerable discussion as to whether or
not the policy statement is, in fact, valid. This is not the appropriate forum to
discuss the matter fully. The arguments commonly made are, however, as follows:
(1) The policy statement actually amends s. 24 of the Act which lays down a
particular order which must be followed by the Board. Thus, for example, the
question of an appropriate unit must be settled before a vote is ordered. Under the
pre-hearing vote procedure the vote would take place before the appropriate unit
issue was even considered. (2) The pre-hearing vote constitutes a denial of natural
justice and (3) that this sort of change should be made by regulation and not simply
by a policy statement.
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Labour Relations Board as an effective administrative tribunal.
Surely, if a union is certified without adequate support it will not be
an effective bargaining agent. In other words, certification is merely
a hinge-pin granting a licence to bargain and is certainly no
guarantee of success in the latter. Secondly, it must always be
remembered that an employer is guaranteed the right to "free
speech" in s. 56 (2) of the Trade Union Act. One wonders why
employers do not utilize this opportunity to put their views in an
open and straightforward manner to their employees. If this manner
is adopted and so long as the employer's acts are not excessive, the
Board must accept the exercise of his rights. To use more subtle
methods of communication as evidenced by the facts in Schwartz
and Dominion Stores is simply to invite the suspicion of the Board
and the subsequent problems.
Further problems with the certification provisions have arisen of
late in the Hawker Siddeley99 and Dominion Stores'0 0 cases. The
main questions on these two decisions have not revolved around the
issue of certification without a vote, however, but on the
acceptability of the applicant for certification. In Dominion Stores
Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board (N.S.), the Retail Clerks'
International Association was certified as bargaining agent for the
appellant's employees without a vote. Inter alia, the appellant
alleged' 0 ' that the Labour Relations' Board had proceeded to certify
without jurisdiction in that the application had not been signed by a
person authorized in accordance with the provisions of s. 4(d) of the
Trade Union Act. Section 4(d) provides that:
For the purposes of this Act, an application to the Board or any
notice or any collective agreement may be signed, if it is made,
given or entered into
.(d) by a trade union or employers' organization, by the
president and secretary of the trade union or employers'
organization or by any two officers thereof or by any person
authorized for this purpose by resolution duly passed at a meeting
of the trade union or employers' organization.
Regulation 9, dealing with applications for certification, then
provides that an application shall be verified by statutory declaration
99. Unreported decision of the Supreme Court (T.D.) of Nova Scotia, December
4, 1975, S.H. No. 08080. Upheld in the Appellate Division in an unreported
judgment handed down May 31, 1976.
100. Unreported decision of the Supreme Court (T.D.) of Nova Scotia, October
21, 1975, S.H. No. 07063.
101. Id. at 2.
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of a person or persons authorized in accordance with s. 4(d). Unlike
many International Unions, the Retail Clerks' Association does not
form a local before the application is made. The application is made
10 2
initially by the International Union, as contemplated by the Act,
and a local formed thereafter. In the instant case, the application
was made by an International Representative authorized to so act by
a resolution of the Association's Executive Board.
Cowan C. J. held that this procedure did not satisfy Regulation 9
and, therefore, since a valid application was not before the Board it
had no jurisdiction to hear it. The Chief Justice found that the
resolution of the Executive Board was not a "resolution duly passed
at a meeting of the trade union" within s. 4(d). That meeting would
be the meeting of all delegates, in other words, the International
3
Convention. 10
With respect, while this conclusion may be justified by
precedents and technical interpretation, the result it leads to is
ludicrous. The International Convention meets once every five
years and to expect a policy meeting of this nature to be responsible
for the passing of such day to day resolutions is to ignore completely
the structure and organization of international unions. The reason
that the words "meeting of the trade union" are used in s. 4(d) is
simply that when this section was originally drafted it was not the
practice for International Unions to make the application; a local
would normally be formed first. But in that the Act contemplates the
form of application made in the present case, surely the Court
should have made some accommodation to avoid its complete
nullification.
It is suggested that the Chief Justice had two possible alternatives
open to him. The first is suggested by his Lordship himself. Cowan
C.J. implies that had the constitution provided that the Executive
Association could pass such a resolution it might have satisfied s.
4(d). He found, however, that in the instant case there was no such
authorization, express or implied. It is suggested that without
unduly stretching the language, s. 9A of the Constitution
empowering the Executive Board to "have such full power during
the intervals between International Conventions to make such laws
as may be needed in the interest and for the benefit of the
International Association", could have been held to provide such
102. See the definition of trade union, R.S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 2.
103. Supra, note 100 at 12.
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authorization. Moreover, in that in reality the Executive Board, as
with all International Unions, administers the union activities, it
must surely have been possible to assume an acquiescence by the
International Convention in favour of the Executive Board.
In the final analysis one wonders why Cowan C.J. did not make
use of s. 7 of the Act which provides that no proceedings under the
Act "are invalid by reason of any defect in form or technical
irregularity." It is no doubt true that:
All wording in a statute should be interpreted and where possible
given a meaning. Clause [(d)] must therefore be interpreted as
exclusive and meaning those named in the clause and no other or
others can sign an application for certification. ' 0 4 Nevertheless,
so long as the substance of s. 4(d) is satisfied why should a
technical defect be destructive of any application? Nor can there
be any doubt that the substance was satisfied in the instant case.
Section 4(d) can have only two possible rationales. First, to
ensure that those making the application are representing the
wishes of their organization. Secondly, and more importantly, s.
4(d) is necessary to ensure that at the early stage of application
there is a viable entity which the Board can hold responsible for
any fraud or other reprehensible activities. The provision of
responsible officials provides a means for attaching liability to
the union. Without doubt, both these factors were satisfied in the
present case. In light of these factors, it is submitted that the
quashing of a certification and the resultant destruction of a
$400,000 organizing campaign can hardly be justified.
Integrally connected with the question of a valid resolution is the
effect of Regulation 9(3) which provides for the confidentiality of
all documents filed by the union before the Board in an application
for certification. Amongst these documents is the authorization
resolution referred to above. Notwithstanding the specific wording
of Regulation 9(3), Cowan C.J. held that Civil Procedure Rule
56.08 required the document to be forwarded to the Court as part of
the Board record and then disclosed it to the parties. ' 0 5 In the first
place, one would have thought that the specific nature of Regulation
9(3), assuming its validity, 10 6 would have overridden the general
104. Id. quoting from Retail Clerks International Association (1973), 8 N.B.R.
(2d) 452 at 453 (C.A.). The reasoning of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in
this case and in Re Keddy's Motor Inn (Fredericton) Ltd. and Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Helpers and Miscellaneous Workers, Local Union
76 (1974), 9 N.B.R. (2d) 642; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 10 (C.A.) were expressly adopted

by Cowan C.J.
105. S.H. No. 07063 at 4-6.

106. Cowan C.J. did, in fact, 'doubt' the validity of at least part of Regulation 9(3)
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effect of the Civil Procedure Rules. Secondly, the Chief Justice's
conclusion would appear to ignore the reason for the confidentiality
of such documents. While not a particularly important issue in the
instant case, the confidentiality of the application and accompanying documentation is essential in that it frequently contains the
names of union members. Thus, the same rationale applies to the
resolution as to union membership lists. Indeed, in many cases,
confidentiality of the resolution may be of greater importance, since
the latter will presumably contain the names of the principals behind
the organizing campaign. In short, the rationale for confidentiality
is to prevent employer interference and, infrequent as the latter
might be, such rationale is legitimate. It can be argued that this is an
unnecessary fear. Cowan C. J. only disclosed the resolution to the
parties at the conclusion of the court proceedings, and thus,
confidentiality at the hearing stage was maintained. But this
approach ignores the fact that with the certification being quashed
the whole procedure may be begun again with the need for
confidentiality still present. Moreover, it must be remembered that
the union officials will be left unprotected on the many occasions
when another application is not made. While such officials still
would have recourse to the unfair labour practice provisions of the
Act, it does not appear that they have been used very often. 1 0 7 From
the point of view of effective operation of the Act it must be able to
be assured during the organization campaign that the names of the
union officials involved will never be revealed.
One point, however, remained unclear from the Chief Justice's
decision. His Lordship did not specifically state that the parties had
access to the documents covered by Regulation 9(3) as of right.
Although they were part of the Court record, it is possible to read
his judgment as conferring a discretion of publication of such
documents on the presiding judge. Even this minimal protection
appeared to disappear a matter of weeks later when Dubinsky J.
ordered a similar resolution to be disclosed to the parties two days
before the case in question came on for trial. 1 0 8 This implied that

in Dominion Stores and maintained his 'reservations'

in Hawker Siddeley, S.H.

No. 08080.
107. It must be remembered that active union protection of its "members" and
supporters may well diminish in the absence of a certification application.
108.The order was granted November 28, 1975. See the Hawker Siddeley case,

S.H. No. 08080.
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the parties had an automatic right of access to the documents as part
of the Court record.
In Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board
(N.S.), 10 9 the effect of Regulation 9(3) came up for consideration
by Cowan C.J. again. Acting in accordance with the decision in
Dominion Stores, the Chief Executive Officer of the Board had sent
a copy of the resolution to "the presiding judge in a sealed envelope
for his information only." As outlined above, Dubinsky J. then, at
the hearing of a pre-trial motion by the applicant for certiorari,
disclosed it to the parties. 110 At trial, the Chief Justice appeared to
restrict the potential effect of Dubinsky J.'s ruling:
It seems to me that the procedure followed by the Chief
Executive Officer of the Board is the proper one, in the
circumstances. It may be that, in some cases, the exhibits in
question should not be open to inspection by the parties. If such
exhibits are placed in a sealed envelope and are opened only by
order of a judge, the necessary safeguards are provided. 111
While his Lordship appears to be saying that disclosure should be
the rule and not the exception, this passage demonstrates an
appreciation of the potential dangers of unfettered access to
confidential information and, one suspects, a realization of the
rationale of Regulation 9(3). It is to be hoped that "some cases"
become the rule in future.
The remaining grounds for the application for certiorari in
Hawker Siddeley were also disposed of by the Chief Justice in a
manner that proffers some hope of an increased appreciation by the
Courts of the role of the Labour Relations Board. The application
for certification by the Marine, Office and Technical Employees'
Union, Local No. 28 was accompanied by a constitution and
statutory declaration as required by Regulation 9. However, the
constitution filed by the applicant was that of the Marine Workers'
Federation and it was alleged that this had not been adopted by the
local. Moreover, the signatures to the application were the President
and Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation and it was alleged they
had not been elected by the members of the local as officials of the
latter; nor had they been authorized by that entity to make the
application.

109. Id.
110. Supra, note 108.
111. S.H. No. 08080 at 3.
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The applicant employer alleged on the above facts that a proper
constitution had not been filed in that the local should have filed its
own constitution, and thus both the definition of a trade union in s.
l(w) and Regulation 9 had not been satisfied. This argument was
shortly dealt with by Cowan C.J.. His Lordship found that the
question of whether there was a "trade union" was a matter for the
Board to determine within its jurisdiction and not reviewable even
without recourse to s. 18, the privative clause in the Trade Union
Act. 112 Similarly, the Chief Justice found that the constitution
should not be investigated in the context of Regulation 9. This was a
matter going to whether there was a "trade union" and so long as a
constitution of the applicant was filed this was a question for the
3
exclusive determination of the Board. 11
The applicant's alternative argument was again based on the
claim that the signatories to the application for certification had not
114 It
been authorized by a resolution in accordance with s. 4(d).
appears as though no authorization had been given by the applicant
trade union as required but Cowan C. J. did not find it necessary to
answer this question. Relying on s. 11 of the Federation's
constitution which provided that certain officials of the latter shall
be pro tempore officials of the local, his Lordship concluded that
the application had been signed in accordance with s. 4(d) by the
President and Secretary-Treasurer of the applicant trade union." 5
Accordingly, no resolution was necessary.
With respect, this decision of Cowan C. J. is the most
enlightened for some time in the labour law field in Nova Scotia.
For once there is demonstrated an appreciation of the real issues
involved in certification applications and a reluctance to confuse
things by resorting to technicalities. It is true that the Chief Justice
had to resort to technicalities to justify his conclusion. However,
even in the absence of such avenues it is submitted that the same
conclusion should have been reached on the issue of the
constitution. At the risk of repetition, it should be emphasized that
all the Board should be concerned with is that there be a viable
entity applying for certification. One way of measuring the viability
is that the union has a constitution. Article 4 of the Federation
constitution provides that that constitution is mandatory for all
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.at 12.
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locals. Likewise, the by-laws of the local must not conflict with
those of the Federation. Accordingly, whether or not the
constitutional documents had been formally adopted by the local at
the time of certification or the application therefor, it had no
alternative but to treat the Federation's constitution and at least the
basic by-laws as its own. The requirement of a viable entity is
satisfied.
In the final analysis, Cowan C.J.'s enlightened approach is
demonstrated by his implicit approval of the following passages
from earlier decisions of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court:
I venture to remark that any proper reading of union constitutions
must have regard to the twin - fact that they are practical
documents, written for the grievance of workmen and their
various units of organization, and couched in language
appropriate to the laymen who compose and manage those
units.16
Whatever a Court could or would do or not do, a tribunal such as
a Labour Board need not conduct an inquiry as if it were a trial:
Bd. of Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179. Some latitude must
be given such tribunals. They have to deal with very practical
questions in a common sense and often in an expeditious way.
There is a danger that lawyers and Judges with their profession
preconceptions may seek to impose upon them technical
requirements never contemplated by the legislation setting up the
tribunals. I feel that to quash the Board's order in this case would
be to disregard that danger. 117
Such sentiments have been sadly lacking in the past two years in
these very same Courts. It is to be hoped that when the Hawker
Siddeley case reaches the Appellate Division, the Court will
continue the move towards a more sensible balance established by
Cowan C.J.
IV. Untimely Strikes
As- one might expect in times of rapid inflation, the number of
illegal strikes in Nova Scotia, and indeed Canada, has been on the
increase. As a result there have been several decisions in this area
116. Re United Mineworkers of America, DistrictNo. 26 (1960), 44 M.P.R. 270
at 275; 23 D.L.R. (2d) 328 at 333per MacDonald J. (N.S.S.C., A.D.).
117. Re Labour Relations Board (Nova Scotia), InternationalUnion of Operating
Engineers, Local No. 721 v. Municipal Spraying and ContractingLtd., [1955] 1
D.L.R. 353 at 370per lllsley C.J., (N.S.S.C., T.D.), affd (1955), 36 M.P.R. 240;
[195512 D.L.R. 681(N.S.S.C. in Banco).
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during the last eighteen months. Perhaps the most important,
certainly the most publicized, is the discussion of the cease and
desist order by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the
Tomko case 118 and very recently the Supreme Court of Canada on
appeal in the same decision. In addition, however, both the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board have had cause to consider the validity of strike votes which
are a prerequisite to legitimate collective action under the Trade
Union Act.
In Tomko v. N.S. LabourRelations Board,119 the plaintiff sought
an order in the nature of certiorarito quash a cease and desist order
issued by the Construction Industry Panel under s. 49 of the Trade
Union Act. The order was directed against Local 115 of the
Labourers' International Union and against the plaintiff and ordered
the employees of Canatom Mon-Max represented by the union
"who had participated in an illegal work stoppage to forthwith
cease and desist from participating in the illegal work stoppage"
and the plaintiff to "direct all employees, members of the union
• . .who are participating in the illegal work stoppage to return to
work forthwith", and the plaintiff and the union to "cease and
desist from causing and condoning the illegal work stoppage". The
plaintiff and members of the union chose to ignore the Board's order
and the Attorney General commenced an action against the plaintiff
0
under the Trade Union Act for breach of the order. 12
For the purposes of this discussion' 2 1 mention need only be made
of two of the plaintiffs arguments. First, he claimed that the Panel
was improperly constituted and thus the order invalidated because
MacNeil, a member of the Panel, was biased and disqualified from
acting. Secondly, he claimed that there had been a denial of natural
justice in that the plaintiff and employees to whom the order had
118. Tomko v. N.S. Labour Relations Board, Canatom Mon-Max, Labourers
International Union of North America, Local 115 and the Attorney-General of
Nova Scotia (1975), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 277 (S.C., A.D.). The decision of the Supreme

Court of Canada was unreported at the time of writing.
119. Id.
120. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 82.
121. The third ground of appeal, which was dismissed by the Court concerned the
validity of the cease and desist order. Tomko claimed that s. 49 of the Trade Union

Act pursuant to which the order was issued was ultra vires the Provincial
Legislature and unconstitutional because it purported to confer on the Board
judicial powers and practices which under s. 96 of the British North America Act
could only be exercised by and conferred upon a Court whose members are
appointed by the Governor-General in Council. See supra, note 118 at 282.
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been directed were given no adequate notice of the matters alleged
against them and no opportunity to answer the complaint by
presenting evidence or otherwise making representations to the
Panel. The Appellate Division dismissed the application for
certiorarion all grounds.
The first argument based on bias rested on MacNeil's
participation in a series of meetings at the time of the illegal work
stoppage, and certain statements he was alleged to have made
encouraging Tomko to send the men back to work and to adopt the
arbitration procedure.12 2 MacKeigan C. J. dealt with this
submission very quickly:
This does not mean, however, that the standards of what
constitutes disqualifying interest or bias are the same for a
tribunal like the Panel as for the Courts. The nature and purpose
of the Trade Union Act dictate that members "bring an
experience and knowledge acquired extra-judicially to the
solution of their problems" (Lord Simonds in John East [1949]
A.C. 134 at 151, [1948]4 D.L.R. 673 at 682).
The many unions and many subcontractors and suppliers
involved in any single construction project make it inevitable that
union represenatatives on the Panel and most employer
representatives would each have at least an indirect interest,
much knowledge and many preconceptions and prejudgments
respecting any matter coming before the Panel. Thus, mere prior
knowledge of the particular case or preconceptions or even
prejudgments
cannot be held per se to disqualify a Panel
23
member. 1
His Lordship then found that the knowledge and opinions
demonstrated by MacNeil's opinions would no way be likely to
lead him from exercising his duties impartially as a Board member.
The writers respectfully agree with this finding. To have held
otherwise on the facts would have placed the Panel in an impossible
position. As MacKeigan C.J. noted, there is a great likelihood that
one of the Panel member's union or organization will be connected
or interested in any dispute that arises. To require of members like
Mr. MacNeil that they neglect their union's interest in a particular
dispute merely because they may be required to participate in a
consideration of it at a later date would in large part diminish their
usefulness. Such members are selected because they have been
heavily involved in union activities and understand the process.
Id. at 297.
123. Id. at298.
122.
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Moreover, it must be remembered that the Nova Scotia Board is
part-time and therefore envisages that the members will be engaged
in their normal activities much of the time. If a member of a full
time Panel chose to go out and actively participate in discussions he
knew would be likely to come before him the matter might well be
different. In the Nova Scotia context, however, the end result of
upholding the plaintiff's contention would be to prohibit appropriately qualified personnel from serving on the Panel.
This is not to say that a member of the Panel is immune from a
finding of bias. His Lordship made it abundantly clear that in the
presence of "a prejudiced attitude of mind displayed by the member
before the proceedings or during the proceedings", i.e. "prejudice
4
of a highly personal and unreasoned distortion of judgment",12
actual bias would be shown. Thus, where both the plaintiff and the
member in question were involved in a serious jurisdictional dispute
which came before the panel it would presumably be advisable for
the member not to sit.
The second ground for the application, the absence of notice and
lack of opportunity to present evidence and make representations,
raises a more difficult problem. Section 49(2) of the Act provides
that the Board may 1 25 "after investigation of the complaint that
section 48 has not been complied with . . . issue an interim order
requiring any person named in the order to forthwith cease and
desist any activity or action or perform any act or commence any
activity or action stated in the interim order." Section 49(3) permits
the Board "before or after the making of an interim order" to
authorize an official "to enquire into the acts complained of, to
endeavour to effect a settlement and to make a report to the Board".
If a settlement is not effected or a person named in an interim order
requests so in writing, the Board by s. 49(4) "shall conduct a
hearing for the purpose of considering evidence and making
representations . . .' Section 49(5) then provides for the issuance
of a final order.
Counsel for the defendants argued that the provision in s. 49(4)
for a final hearing negatived any requirement to give notice. They
also claimed that while natural justice governed the procedure of the
124. Id. at 299.
125. The circumstances in which a Board or Panel would utilize this apparent
discretion are not at all clear but presumably it might be utilized where work
conditions are unsafe or where an order to cross established picket lines would
result in physical violence.
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Board by s. 15(9),126 it was excluded with respect to interim cease
and desist orders by virtue of s. 15(10).127
MacKeigan C.J. rejected both these arguments. He found that s.
15(10) had nothing to do with the Board's power to grant the order
but only with the procedure leading to the decision to grant. 128 His
Lordship then supported his conclusion by reference to ss. 91(9) and
93(2). The former is the equivalent of s. 15(10) and in addition
applies it to the "speedy certification" in s. 92 used in the
construction industry. The latter specifically provides that s. 15(9)
shall not apply to s. 92 applications. Why, his Lordship contended
with some force, did the legislature not also specifically omit ss. 49
1 29
and 50 from the scope of s. 15(9) if this was what was intended?
With respect to the argument based on s. 49(4), the Chief Justice
found that while in some situations provision for a subsequent
hearing may negative any implied requirement of notice and
opportunity to be heard, this was not the case where there was an
express provision to this effect in s. 15(9).13o
Accordingly, MacKeigan C.J. found that the rules of natural
justice did govern the granting of an interim cease and desist order.
He also found, however, that any requirements had been satisfied
on the facts of the case. Taking an exceptionally realistic view of the
situation, the Chief Justice held there was no requirement for a
hearing in fact or that an opportunity need be given to talk
personally to the Panel members. The legislation specifically
contemplates in s. 15(10) that the Chief Executive Officer might
make an investigation and then report his findings to the members
individually. If a full hearing was required then arguably ss. 15(10)
and 49(4) would be redundant or at least their object frustrated. The
basic question before the Court was therefore:

126. Section 15(9) reads as follows:
The Board shall determine its own procedure, but shall, subject to subsection
10, in every case give an opportunity to all interested parties to present evidence
and make representation.
127. Section 15 (10) reads as follows:
Upon application for an interim order pursuant to section 49 or section 50 and in
any case where a hearing is not requested, if the Chairman deems it appropriate,
the Board may deal with any matter by each member conferring separately with
the Chief Executive Officer and each deciding the matter.
128. (1975), 9 N.S.R (2d) 277 at 300.

129. Id.
130. Id. at 301.
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.. . whether the plaintiff was in fact fairly treated, having regard
to the nature of the legislation and the facts of the particular

case. 131
There can be little doubt that the Chief Justice was correct in
concluding that Tomko had been fairly treated. The Chief Executive
Officer followed normal procedure in contacting the plaintiff by
telephone to verify the complaint which meant that, like all people
named in an interim order, Tomko had ample opportunity to deny
the complaint and for making representations. Moreover, while not
specifically required by the legislation, it had been the practice of
the Board to afford a hearing in any case where a person named in
an order made a plausible denial that a work stoppage existed or he
was involved in such stoppage. The plaintiff was well aware of this
opportunity; indeed, in his own words, he knew "what it was all
about" 132 but refused to direct the members of his union to cease
their walkout.
The one point that did remain a little unclear about the Board's
procedure is the position of those persons not named individually in
the order but to whom it is directed as a class. Does notice and an
opportunity to make representations have to be granted to such
individuals? The Chief Justice appears to suggest that there is no
such requirement on the Board because of the obvious impracticalities involved. 133 Nevertheless, in practice the Board does
adopt the procedure currently of announcing the issuance of cease
and desist orders over the radio and television and occasionally
places advertisements to this effect in newspapers in the area.
Moreover, for what is apparently enforcement purposes, a
registered letter containing the information will be sent to the union
local concerned. Whether this is sufficient remains to be seen.
From a technical point of view one would think the procedure
was satisfactory since the Board makes the order in a form which
only applies to those people who are actually participating in an
illegal work stoppage. Perhaps more importantly, having regard to
the scheme and intent of s. 49 it would be unfortuanate if strict
notice requirements were placed on the board in such situations.
While the general order may at first glance appear toothless in that it
is only telling the employees to stop doing what they were already
131. Id.
132. Id. at 303.

133. Id.
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prohibited from doing, i.e., breaching the Act, and thus may be
inappropriate in a situation where the union officials are
participating in the strike, it may well be that the speedy written
order is of some assistance to union officials when they are
attempting to get the men back to work. To have the opportunity for
a hearing and notice under s. 15(9) would completely undermine the
latters' efforts.
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Tomko case was
handed down on December 19th, 1975.134 The Court, with de
Grandpr6 J. dissenting, dismissed the appeal on both constitutional
and administrative law grounds. To a large extent the judgment of
the Supreme Court, delivered by Laskin C.J., merely confirms the
view of the Nova Scotia Appellate Division. The administrative law
questions relating to the procedure of the Board were relatively
quickly disposed of. In fact, the Court refused to even hear the
appellant's argument on the question of bias. However, in that the
Chief Justice took a different approach to the requirements of notice
and hearing than did the Nova Scotia Court some comment must be
made.
It will be remembered that in the Appellate Division MacKeigan
C.J. did not accept the argument by the respondent that s. 15(9) of
the Act was inoperative with respect to cease and desist orders. His
Lordship found that it was applicable but that having regard to both
the statutory context and the realities of the instant case the Panel's
procedure satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Thus, notice
and the right to make representations were an important part of the
cease and desist practice. Laskin C.J., however, takes a different
and, it is suggested, more correct approach. The Chief Justice
agreed with the Nova Scotia Court that s. 15(10) was not drafted
clearly enough to override the express terms of s. 15(9)135 but then
proceeded to solve the problem in more precise fashion:
I am prepared to agree that section 15(10) may not have been
drafted clearly enough to exclude the application of section 15(9)
to complaints leading to an interim cease and desist order and to
the making of an order ex parte. In my opinion, however, the
emergency nature of the proceeding is undermined by the terms
of section 49 which in subsection 4 makes provision for a hearing
at the request of a person named in an interim order. Above this,
however, there are the key words in section 49(2) that
134. Supra, note 118.
135. Id. at 16.
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"notwithstanding any provision of this Act" the Board (or Panel)
may issue an interim order if satisfied after investigation of a
complaint that section 48 has not been complied with. This
means notwithstanding section 15(9) and none of the Regulations
upon which the
appellant relies can supersede this statutory
13 6
qualification.
The immediate impression one gets when reading this passage is
that, on account of s. 49(2), there is no requirement of a hearing
unless a party named in the order requests it and likewise that notice
is not a prerequisite to the issuance of an order. It is submitted that
this extreme view is incorrect. It must be borne in mind that s. 49
requires the Board to investigate the complaint before issuing an
order and it would seem that in order for the investigation to be
properly conducted the parties named in the order would have to be
contacted and their views on the matter taken into account. How,
for example, can a proper investigation be carried out into a
complaint that union X is causing a strike unless the responsible
union officials are contacted. The union is, after all, only guilty of a
breach of the Act when its responsible officials have undertaken or
failed to undertake certain acts. To omit to take their evidence into
account, and possibly their denial, is hardly a proper investigation.
The same rationale would apply to all named parties in the order.
Accordingly, the Board would be well advised not to think that the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada enables them to take short
cuts. It is, moreover, worthwhile pointing out that Laskin C.J.
expressly approved of the investigation "in this case". 13 7 This, if
nothing else, is a warning that the quality of the Chief Executive
Officer's preliminary inquiries must not be diminished.
The Tomko case is now finally settled and, not unexpectedly, the
powers of the Labour Relations Board have been strongly
sanctioned. There will still be problems in the future, particularly
the difficulties of enforcing orders against those anonymous
employees named as a class in the order, but this is of relative
unimportance. What is vital is that an extremely effective power in
reinforcing the structure of collective bargaining legislation in Nova
Scotia has been upheld. When one views the alternatives of a simple
declaration or an injunction there can be no doubt but that all parties
are better off.
136. Id. at 16-17.
137. Id. at 17.
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The policy and practice of the Trade Union Act is quite clear.
Once a collective agreement is no longer in force, and the
procedures relating to questions of timeliness have been satisfied, a
union or employer may legitimately take action in the form of a
strike or lockout. In the Trade Union Act one of these procedural
requirements is the taking of a strike vote "by the unit affected."'13 8
Not surprisingly, very little jurisprudence is to be found on the
validity of strike votes; not surprising, of course, in that if the
system is operating properly and both parties accept the possibility
of collective action as an integral part of that system, there would
seem to be no long term advantage in nullifying what is in substance
legitimate action on a technicality. Recently, however, both the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board have had cause to consider this very question.
In Terra Nova Motor Inn Ltd. v. Beverage Dispensers and
Culinary Workers' Union, Local 835,139 the appellant union was
certified as bargaining agent for employees of two British Columbia
hotels in 1968 and 1970 respectively. In 1971 at the request of the
British Columbia Hotels Association, the union agreed that they
would bargain with the two hotels jointly on behalf of employees of
both hotels as a single group. Following negotiations a collective
agreement was signed. At the expiry of this agreement in 1973
negotiations were entered into by the union and the two hotels on
the same basis as for the previous agreement. Eventually
negotiations broke down and the union, in order to comply with s.
25 of the Mediation Services Act 1 40 requiring a strike vote, took a
secret ballot of the employees as one group. A majority of the
employees voted to strike and the required notice was served on
both hotels. However, before the joint strike eventuated a
conciliation report was placed before the parties. The employees of
both hotels voted to accept the proposals as did one of the employers
who signed a collective agreement with his employees. The second
employer rejected the report and without conducting another strike
vote the employees of this hotel commenced striking.
The basic issue before the Supreme Court of Canada was the
validity and effect of the joint strike vote. Two questions had to be
answered. First, did the union have the legal right to conduct a joint
strike vote at all. Secondly, if the original vote was valid, did
138. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 45(3) (c).
139. (1974), 3 N.R. 297; 74 C.L.L.C. 14, 253 (S.C.C.).
140. S.B.C. 1968, c. 26.
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majority support in this joint vote entitle the employees of one
employer to go on strike after the other had signed a collective
agreement, without taking a separate vote. The Supreme Court
decided the first issue in the affirmative. The second was decided by
the majority in the negative. In both issues the validity of the joint
strike vote centered on the meaning of s. 25 of the Mediation
Services Act:
No person shall declare or authorize a strike, and no employee
shall strike, until after a vote has been taken by secret ballot of
the employees in the unit affected as to whether to strike or not to
strike and the majority of such employees who vote have voted in
favour of such a strike.
In deciding the first issue affirmatively, the Supreme Court was
unanimously of the opinion that the word "unit" in s. 25 of the Act
was not restricted to the unit decided at the time of certification. The
word was defined generally as meaning "a group of employees on
whose behalf a trade union is, or has been, engaged in collective
bargaining" 14 ' and quite clearly the group concerned was the
combined certified units. In other words, the Supreme Court was
stating that through the process of voluntary recognition the initially
certified units had been merged with the consent of the employers
into a single new unit for the purposes of multi-party bargaining.
This affirmation of the effect of voluntary recognition is particularly
evident in the judgment of the Chief Justice.
What we are being asked to do in this case is to unscramble an
omelette. If it is the case that unions that have bargained with
more than one employer cannot lawfully take a strike vote of the
composite employee force if they have not been certified for a
multi-employer unit, what then becomes of voluntary collective
bargaining and voluntary collective agreements? I see no
difference that makes industrial relations sense between a
situation where a union has initially bargained with more than
one employer without having been certified in any way and a
situation where it has bargained with a group of employers jointly
after having been certified (and perhaps bargained) separately
collective
with each of them before entering into one composite
42
agreement covering the employees of all employers. 1
These strongly-worded sentiments did not, however, convince
the majority of their Lordships that they should also decide the
second issue in the affirmative. Spence J. appears to treat the strike
141. Id. ats. 2(1).
142. (1974),3N.R. 297 at 305; 74 C.L.L.C. 14,253.
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actually commenced by the individual unit of employees as being
quite distinct from that proposed and voted on by the joint group. ' 43
Beetz J., adopting a slightly different line of reasoning, found that
the voluntary joint unit had been voluntarily dissolved the moment
that one component of that unit and one employer entered into a
collective agreement. 144 Both of their Lordships concluded,
however, that the "unit affected" in s. 25 was that consisting of the
employees who actually went on strike. Accordingly, the strike vote
had to be taken among this group and the joint vote was not
satisfactory.
Laskin C.J. and Dickson J. adopted similar lines of reasoning in
their dissenting opinions. The Chief Justice concluded that so long
as the strike was undertaken within the procedural requirements of
s. 25(2) of the Act it was legal and dismissed the contention of the
majority that the validity of the procedure adopted by the union
could change between the time when the vote was taken and when
the strike actually commenced.1 45 In what was perhaps the clearest
proposition, of this approach, Dickson J. simply stated:
In my view the proper time to determine the validity of a vote is
at the time the vote is taken, and not at the time some of the
employees affected by the vote actually go on strike. Validity
should not depend14 6on the course of, or be invalidated by,
subsequent events.
With respect, the view of the dissenting Justices seems more
convincing. There is something illogical in the concept of a
voluntary unit being voluntarily dissolved and then possibly
reconstituted next time bargaining commences. Moreover, it would
be nice to know the response of the majority had the joint strike
commenced and then after one day those employed by one hotel
signed a collective agreement. Would the strike vote have been
taken amongst the "unit affected" in this case? If so, why should
one day, one hour or whatever the length of the strike make any
difference?
This is not to say that there is no force in the arguments relied on
by the majority. Spence J. argued that in the case of a strike by the
employees of an employer directed only against the latter, a small
firm might be disadvantageously placed if the strike vote was taken
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
id.

at
at
at
at

300.
301.
306.
309.
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by all employees in a unit, most of whom were employed
elsewhere. It is submitted, however, that this approach, taken
literally, is an incorrect interpretation of the legislation. The British
Columbia legislation contemplated multi-party bargaining and there
is no reference in the Act to any obligation on the part of a union to
take all its members out on strike at the same time. Surely this is no
different from the case of a single employer unit; all the employees
do not have to strike and the "unit affected" does not alter because
of this. His Lordship's reliance on the fact that a majority of those in
the smaller unit "might" have voted against the strike in the ballot
may be similarly queried, this is an integral part of the risk that an
employer takes in dealing with a union on a multi-employer basis. It
might be added the union runs an identical risk that a majority of the
joint unit may well nullify the wishes of the employees of a small
firm to go on strike. Finally, one wonders whether his Lordship has
not fallen into the old trap of overestimating the importance of the
technical requirement of a strike vote. From a practical point of
view, if there is no support within the individual unit for a strike,
surely the mere fact that there is the necessary majority support in
the joint vote will not coerce the individual unit into taking
collective action.
More important is the effect that the majority approach has on the
concept of voluntary recognition. The two hotels had bargained
jointly with the union, indeed they had initiated the approach, and it
appears contrary to industrial relations good faith for one of them to
subsequently negate the multi-party proceedings. This is particularly so when the employer concerned was as a result placed in a
stronger bargaining position because he had fewer employees. In
the long term, the union response to the decision could well be to
take everyone out on strike regardless of the fact that one group
within the joint unit may be satisfied. This is hardly conducive to
the maintenance of industrial peace.
Does this case apply in Nova Scotia? At first sight the decision of
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (en banc) in Jacobsen Bros. v.
Anderson 1 47 would appear to be in direct conflict with the
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the first
issue. In that case, the Nova Scotia Court held that otherwise legal
picketing was unlawful because a joint strike vote had been taken of
employees employed by the same company but certified in different
147. (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 746; 62 C.L.L.C. 15,433 (N.S.S.C.).
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units. It appears relatively clear from the facts in Jacobsen,
however, that the employer had not agreed to recognize a joint unit
and thus the element of voluntary recognition, which was the vital
component in the Terra Nova case, is missing. The individual
certified units were, therefore, still the "unit affected" by the strike
vote. Certainly, the Supreme Court of Canada cannot be interpreted
as permitting a union to join units of its own accord and legally
compel the employer to recognize and deal with the joint unit. The
Jacobsen decision would, accordingly, appear to still be good law
in Nova Scotia.
Would, however, Terra Nova have been decided the same way if
it had arisen under the Trade Union Act? It is submitted that the
answer is yes. In the first place, while there were two distinct
statutes at issue in the British Columbia case, the relevant sections
are basically the same in both jurisdictions. While "unit" is not
defined in the context of collective bargaining in Nova Scotia,
neither does the Trade Union Act restrict its meaning to certification
8 Similarly, s.
proceedings. 14
45(3) (a) dealing with the strike vote
uses essentially the same terminology as s. 25 of the Mediation
Services Act. Finally the Nova Scotia Act clearly envisages
multi-party bargaining and agreements.
Secondly, while the Trade Union Act does provide for a system
of exclusive certification for at least 12 months, 149 the relevant
terminology of the provisions and those relating to voluntary
recognition appear to permit a voluntary joinder of separate
bargaining units. Section 25 refers to a trade union having exclusive
bargaining rights over employees in the unit. Since the same trade
union maintained bargaining rights one must conclude that there has
been no infringement of the section. In similar vein, s. 28(3)(b)
provides that voluntary recognition under the Act will not be
permitted if at the time the agreement is filed, another trade union
has acquired bargaining rights or has applied for certification. In
other words, the policy of the Act is to prevent raiding by another
union. If the interests of all existing units and bargaining agents are
better served by a combination of units which does not effect the
status of the current bargaining agent, then there would seem to be
no objection to that course being adopted.
148. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 1(4) reads: ."unit' means a group of two or more
employees."
149. Id. at s. 22(3).
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Two final points might be made. While the Terra Nova decision
applies to Nova Scotia, it must be emphasized that since the essence
150 of
of that case is voluntary recognition, all procedural aspects
that phenomonon required by the Trade Union Act must be
respected. Otherwise the new unit will have no status under the
legislation and any strike vote and consequent action would be
illegal. Moreover, it should be mentioned that a procedure for the
51
combination of certification orders does exist under the Act.1
While this may reduce the flexibility achieved by voluntary
recognition, this method may provide a safer approach for those
who are not prepared to test the validity of the above views.
In Aerovox Canada Ltd. and I.B.E.W. Local 625,152 the Nova
Scotia Labour Relations Board had to consider a completely
different aspect of the strike vote. Section 45(3) (a) provides that a
legal strike cannot take place:
• . •until after a secret vote by ballot of employees in the unit
affected as to whether to strike or not to strike has been taken and
the majority of such employees have voted in favour of a strike.
A majority of the employees in Local 625 who had voted were in
favour of a strike but the Board was not convinced that a majority of
employees in the unit had so voted. Accordingly, the Board found
that s. 45(3) (a) had not been satisfied and issued a cease and desist
order against what was therefore technically an illegal strike.
In finding that s. 45(3) (a) requires a majority vote of all
employees in the unit, the Board upset what appears to be the current
union practice in the province of only requiring a majority of those
who vote. They were, however, precluded from any other
conclusion. The words "such employees" in s. 45(3) (a) clearly
refer back to "employees in the unit . . ." Moreover, the earlier
decision of the supreme Court in Jacobsen Bros. 153 was apparently
premised on such a construction.
Nevertheless, the decision may have some unfortunate consequences. The smaller unit is generally more subject to employer
influence and it is conceivable that the absence of even a few
employees on account of illegitimate pressure might make any legal
strike impossible. While recourse to the unfair labour practice
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at s. 28.
Id. at s.26(1) (d).
L.R.B. No. 2209.
(1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 746; 62 C.L.L.C. 15,433.
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provisions is available to the union these are notoriously difficult to
prove and as a general rule do not provide a satisfactory remedy in
this situation. It may be argued that, on the other hand, any other
approach would permit a small group of employees to commit the
entire work force to a strike. However, this presupposes once again
that blind loyalty to the union will prevail and that the unwilling
majority will happily walk off the job at the request of a few
brothers. Even if picketing eventuates, one doubts whether in
industrial undertakings at least, any union ethic will sustain a
minority effort for very long. What is certain is that it does not assist
the credibility of the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board for it to
have to prohibit strikes which are illegitimized solely by a
technicality.
V. Timely IndustrialAction
It must always be remembered that the Trade Union Act and the
regulatory system it institutes does no constitute the entirety of
labour law in Nova Scotia. It only provides who may enter the
conflict and when such conflict may take place; it has little, if any,
involvement in regulating how the conflict is carried out. This is
particularly so where the strike is a lawful one under the Act. To
solve this problem one must have regard to the common law,
particularly the law of torts. There is certainly no shortage of
material dealing with this subject matter as the law of picketing is an
"old favourite" of academic writers. Two recent decisions, one by
the Supreme Court of Canada and the other by the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court, should, however, be of interest to readers.
In Carswell v. Harrison'54 the Supreme Court of Canada had to
face the vexed question of picketing in a shopping centre. The
essential facts in question were as follows. A lawful strike had been
commenced against Dominion Stores Ltd. which was a tenant in a
shopping centre. The respondent, who was an employee of
Dominion Stores Ltd., was peacefully picketing on the sidewalk
adjacent to the front of the store building but still on the property of
the shopping centre. The manager, a representative of the owner of
the shopping centre, told the respondent to cease picketing as she
was trespassing on private property. The latter refused to move and
continued picketing. Subsequently, she was charged and convicted

154. (1975), 5 N.R. 523; 75 C.L.L.C. 15,306 (S.C.C.).
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under the Petty Trespass Act. 155 On appeal from the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the
conviction by a majority.
The importance of this decision does not rest solely on the fact
that the respondent was found guilty of trespass. The vital
consideration is that in future instances picketing of a similar nature
which is otherwise quite legitimate will be tainted by this technical
illegality. This was not the first time that Canadian Courts had been
asked to face the issue of interference with the property rights of
those with an interest in shopping centres. In Zellers (Western) Ltd.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1518, 15 the British Columbia Court
of Appeal faced the question of a suit by the tenant of a shopping
centre to enjoin all picketing on the sidewalk in front of his store on
the ground that it illegally interfered with his easement over that
property. While the case was decided on the basis of nuisance,
Davey J.A. was clearly taking into account the public character of
the shopping centre in holding that the picketing was lawful. His
Lordship, however, left open the issue of an action by the owner of
the shopping centre in trespass. This matter was taken up by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Grovesner Park Shopping Centre
v. Cave. 157 In this case the shopping centre owner had sued in
trespass to restrain picketing in support of a legal strike by
employees of a tenant on the parking area and sidewalk. In finding
that the picketers were not guilty of trespass the Court of Appeal
based their decision on a lack of possession by the owner. Once
again, some emphasis was placed by the Court on the fact that the
centre was open to the public.
Against these decisions must be placed that in Peters v.
Regina, 158 handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada itself
only five years ago. In Peters the picketing was undertaken to
obtain a boycott of a tenant in a shopping centre who was selling
Californian grapes. Although the picketing was peaceful the Ontario
Court of Appeal 159 found the picketers guilty of trespass. More
specifically, the Court found that by inviting the public to use the
shopping centre the owner had not lost the right to withdraw that
invitation whenever he felt like it, and that so long as the owner had
155. R.S.M. 1970, c. P-50.
156. (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 582; 45 W.W.R. (N.S.) 337 (B.C.C.A.)..

157. (1964), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 750; 49 W.W.R. (N.S.) 237 (Sask. C.A.).
158. (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 128 (S.C.C.).
159. [1970] 1 O.R. 597; 16 D.L.R. (3d) 143 (C.A.).
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a right of overall control he had sufficient possession to bring an
action in trespass. An appeal was then heard by the Supreme Court
on the narrow question as to whether the Ontario Court had erred as
to its finding on sufficient possession and the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the decision. Accordingly, the stage was set for
the matter to be finally settled in the Carswell case.
The majority judgment, delivered by Dickson J., proceeded from
the premise that unless the decision in Peters could be distinguished
that case must be regarded as controlling. The main argument of the
respondent to this end was that in Peters the picketer was a member
of the general public whereas in the present case the respondent was
an employee of a tenant engaged in a legitimate strike. His
Lordship, however, came to the conclusion that this distinction
could not be maintained; even admitting and taking into account the
social and economic desirability and public commitment to effective
picketing, in the absence of express statutory language to the
contrary, the provisions of the Petty Trespass Act applied to
employees as well as members of the general public. 16 0 In essence,
then, Dickson J.'s finding was that, in the context of industrial
action in a shopping centre, the property rights of the centre's owner
took paramountcy over any implied right to effectively picket.
The dissenting opinion was again written by the Chief Justice. As
one might expect, Laskin C.J. felt that the Peters case could be
distinguished on the basis that a direct employment relationship and
a legitimate strike were at issue here. 1 61 There were policy
considerations that the Court did not have to take into account in
answering the narrow issue before it in the earlier decision.
Accordingly, placing heavy emphasis on the need to balance the
traditional rights of property with an implied right to picket
effectively, and the dangers of applying historical legal doctrines
automatically to new factual situations, Laskin C.J. concluded that
the action of the respondent was legal and did not constitute
trespass. In reaching this conclusion his Lordship did not, however,
limit himself to legitimizing the actions of the picketer on the
particular facts before him. Rather, relying to some extent on
United States' jurisprudence and also the Civil Code, he proceeded
to develop a general theory of privilege and quasi-public property
160. (1975), 75 C.L.L.C. 15,306 at 15,308-15,309; 5 N.R. 523 at 528. This is

particularly so when the labour relations legislation in question specifically
reserved certain rights in trespass. See at 15,309.
161. Id. at 15,310; 5 N.R. at 528.
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which would appear to restrict the general property rights of at least
a shopping centre owner quite severely.
If it was necessary to categorize the legal situation which, in
my view, arises upon the opening of a shopping centre, with
public areas of the kind I have mentioned (at least where the
opening is not accompanied by an announced limitation on the
classes of public entrants), I would say that the members of the
public are privileged visitors whose privilege is revocable only
upon misbehaviour (and I need not spell out here what this
embraces) or by reasons of unlawful activity. Such a view
reconciles both the interests of the shopping centre owner and of
the members of the public, doing violence to neither and
recognizing the mutual or reciprocal commercial interests of
shopping centre owner, business tenants and members of the
public upon which the shopping centre is based.
The respondent picketer in the present case is entitled to the
privilege of entry and to remain in the public areas to carry on as
she did (without obstruction of the sidewalk or incommoding of
others) as being not only a member of the public but being as
well, in relation to her peaceful picketing, an employee involved
in a labour dispute with a tenant of the shopping centre, and
hence having an interest, sanctioned by law, in pursuing
the peaceful
legitimate claims against her employer 6through
2
picketing in furtherance of a lawful strike. 1
In other words, the Chief Justice was of the opinion that the
doctrine of trespass was inappropriate to the modem concept of a
shopping centre where interests other than that of the owner of
private property had to be considered and that, accordingly, the
strict property rights of the latter should in some circumstances be
subordinated.
There are a number of technical problems with Laskin C.J.'s
approach. First, his Lordship would appear to be incorrect in his
assessment of the general rights of a shopping centre owner to
control his property.- 6 3 To the writer's knowledge there is no
Commonwealth authority for the proposition that a landowner's
right to refuse entry is subject to any common law restriction. What
Laskin C.J. appears to be stating as a preliminary proposition of law
is no more than a statement of what he would like to be a general
principle. Moreover, insofar as the Chief Justice relies on the
United States' approach for justification for his analysis there are
the usual problems. While his Lordship would like to ignore the
162. Id., at 15,313; 5 N.R. at 536-537.

163. Id., at 15,312; 5 N.R. at 536.
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constitutional basis for the American cases, this would seem to be
impossible. The leading decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza ' 4 is almost entirely based on an attempt to rationalize
property rights with the First Amendment. Indeed, both the majority
and dissenting opinions in that case are concerned far more with the
general right of free speech than with the social and economic
implications of effective picketing. It is true that these cases do arise
out of the same economic and social setting but the fact is that the
United States' courts have not directly relied on that setting for
developing their jurisprudence but on the wider implications of an
express constitutional right.
Nevertheless, these are minor problems and do not detract from
the overall impact of the Chief Justice's opinion. More important is
the second line of criticism; namely, that Laskin C.J. makes little, if
any, attempt to define the circumstances in which the law of
trespass will not apply. His Lordship's comments are restricted to
shopping centres but his theory of a quasi-public place certainly is
not. As the United States Supreme Court recently stated in Lloyd
65
Corporationv. Tanner:1
It is noteworthy that respondent's argument based on the Centers
being "open to the public" would apply in varying degrees to
most retail stores and service establishments across the country.
They are all open to the public in the sense that customers and
potential customers are invited and encouraged to enter. In terms
of being open to the public, there are differences only of degree
-

not of principle -

between a free standing store and one

located in a shopping center, between a small store and a large
one, between a single store with some malls and open areas
designed to attract customers and
Lloyd Center with its elaborate
66
malls and interior landscaping. 1
There is no suggestion that Laskin C.J. envisages countenancing
picketing inside the local corner grocery shop. Nevertheless,
without going to this extreme, the problem is highlighted by asking
what his Lordship's response would have been had the picketing
taken place on the "property" of a single large department store
which supplied its own parking lot. Presumably the Chief Justice
would permit such action; any other answer would be inconsistent
with his general theory and the policy considerations behind it. It
164. (1968) 391 U.S. 308.
165. (1972) 407 U.S. 551.
166. Id. at 565-566per Powell J.

838 The Dalhousie Law Journal

can be argued, however, that rather different policy considerations
apply in this case. In a shopping centre the property rights of the
owner are to an extent indirect in that he has leased areas to third
parties. His interests are therefore more concerned with protecting
the commercial well-being of the tenants. In our example on the
other hand, the property owners property rights are far more evident
as are his personal commercial interests and to subordinate them to
an implied right of picketing is a much greater jurisprudential step to
take. Unfortunately, the Chief Justice gives us no assistance in
drawing an appropriate line.
Laskin C.J. also envisaged that a shopping centre owner would
still retain the right to restrict activity on the premises where the
opening of the complex was accompanied by an announcement to
this effect. 167 Ignoring the question of what happens if the owner
makes such a decision one year after the opening, there is an
additional problem with the Carswell case. Namely, one wonders
why the following statement of fact did not bring the shopping
centre in question within the exception:
The evidence discloses that the distribution of pamphlets or
leaflets in the mall of the Polo Park Shopping Centre or on the
parking lot has never been permitted by the management of the
centre and this prohibition has extended to tenants of the centre.
The centre as a matter of policy has
not permitted any person to
68
walk in the mall carrying placards. 1
Laskin C. J. did not seem to consider this evidence sufficient to
protect the owner of the shopping centre. Does the Chief Justice
contemplate that a formal announcement of such practice must be
made? If so, it is submitted that this introduces a note of technicality
uncharacteristic of his Lordship's judgments. What is required is
some action on the part of the owner that makes it apparant that
there are limitations on the use of the centre as a quasi-public place
and a practice of restricting picketing and parading should be
sufficient. Indeed, this is a substantial defect in the Chief Justice's
theory of privileged entry. One might ask why, if his Lordship is so
concerned with balancing interests and maintaining the right to
effectively picket, such an exception should exist at all. Surely the
right to picket should only be limited by misconduct; otherwise, will
not the owner always have the effective right of prohibiting such
action? To this end it might have been preferable to find an absolute
167. (1975), 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 306 at 15,312;5 N.R. 523 at 536.
168. Id. at 15,308; 5 N.R. at 528.
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right to picket based on an implied right in the relevant labour
legislation which overrode the general restriction in the Petty
Trespass Act. Admittedly, this would not have solved the legal
problem entirely for this conclusion would be open to criticism.
Nevertheless, in that this approach would give an unqualified right
to picket effectively in the absence of misconduct the result would
seem far more in accord with the Chief Justice's assessment of the
policy considerations.
The final definitional problem is simply just what sort of activity
will be permitted within a shopping centre against the wishes of the
owner and what action will result in the privilege of conducting such
activities being removed justifiably. Laskin C. J. clearly considers
some restriction but makes no attempt to define even broadly the
limits of his approach. 16 9 Presumably, in the absence of any help,
one must assume that as usual the nominate torts will provide a
potential prohibition on otherwise legal picketing. Even if the Chief
Justice had been in the majority, this factor must of necessity have
caused unions some concern.
These criticisms of the Chief Justice's approach should not be
construed as meaning that the writers do not agree with his
Lordship's overall sentiments. From a purely industrial relations
perspective there can be no other satisfactory conclusion than that
reached by Laskin C. J.. The policy considerations have been dealt
with elswehere 170 and need not be discussed in detail. It is obvious,
however, that the majority judgment in reasserting property rights
has precluded effective picketing of shopping centres and their
tenants in the absence of express statutory permission. Equally
obviously, this result is not in accord with the legislative recognition
of legitimate conflict which is to a large extent dependent on the
economic pressure generated by such picketing. Why should:
[b]usiness enterprises located in downtown areas [on public
streets and sidewalks] be subject to on-the-spot public criticism
for their practices, but business situated in the suburbs [be largely
immunized] . . . from similar criticism by creating a cordon
sanitaire of parking lots around their store. 171
This approach

is,

however, only half the problem. It is

169. Id. at 15,314; 5 N.R. at 540.
170. See H. Arthurs, Labour Law - Picketing in Shopping Centres (1965), 43
Can. B. Rev. 357.
171. Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza
(1968), 391 U.S. 308 at 324-325per Marshall J.
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impossible to appreciate the reasoning of either Dickson J. or the
Chief Justice without having regard to the philosophical premises as
to the role of the Supreme Court from which each proceeds. As far
as Dickson J. is concerned, at the basis of his judgment, is a very
conscious belief that the role of the Supreme Court in delicate social
and economic issues must be to proceed with caution. While not
denying the right of the Court to reform, and while clearly
appreciating the conflicting interests involved, Dickson J. made it
quite clear that he does not see it as proper for the Court to abandon
well-established principles and decisions overnight in the name of
social consciousness. Such a role is to be played by the legislature.
The submission that this Court should weigh and determine the
respective values to society of the right to picket raises important
and difficult political and socio-economic issues, the resolution
of which must, by their very nature, be arbitrary and embody
personal economic and social beliefs. It also raises fundamental
questions as to the role of this Court under the Canadian
Constitution. The duty of this Court, as I envisage it, is to
proceed in the discharge of its adjudicative function in a reasoned
way from principled decision and established concepts. I do not
for a moment doubt the power of this Court to act creatively - it
one must ask
has done so on countless occasions; but manifestly
172
- what are the limits of the judicial function?
As one might have expected, the Chief Justice's conception of the
role of the Supreme Court is far more encompassing.
This Court, above all others in this country, cannot be simply
mechanistic about previous decisions, whatever be the respect it
would pay to such decisions. What we would be doing here, if we
were to say that the Peters case, because it was so recently
decided, has concluded the present case for us, would be to take
merely one side of a debatable issue and say that it concludes the
debate without the need to hear the other side.
I do not have to call upon pronouncements of members of this
Court that we are free to depart from previous decisions in order
to support the pressing need to examine the present case on its
merits. Pressing, because there are probably many hundreds of
shopping centres in this country where similar issues have arisen
and will arise

. .

. There are judgments in related cases, that were

cited to us in argument, that need to be taken into consideration in
order to enable this Court to begin to draw lines which Courts are
habitually called upon to do. There should be, at least, some
indication that the Court has addressed itself to the difficult issues
172. (1973), 75 C.L.L.C. 15,308-15,309; 5 N.R. 523 at 529.
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that reside in the competing contentions that were made in this
case and to which I will refer later on in these reasons. But above
all, this Court has not shown itself to be timorous in tackling
important issues where it could be said, with some justification
that an important consideration was absent from an earlier
judgment, even a recent one, upon which reliance was placed to
foreclose examination of similar issue in a subsequent case. 173
With respect, it is impossible to criticize either of these
approaches. The essential problem is reflected in the result of the
case. On the one hand the Chief Justice's conclusion is laudable in
that it gives realistic effect to the right to strike; at the same time
while being a sensible approach to a new factual situation, the
reasoning has little if any authority and its advantage of flexibility is
severely minimized by problems of uncertainty. On the other hand,
Dickson J. may have given effect to basic and well established legal
principles, but at the same time his subordination of industrial
relations reality to strict property rights has sounded the apparent
death knell as far as effective picketing of shopping centres is
concerned. Nevertheless, the latter's judgment cannot be simply
dismissed as another piece of judicial conservatism, applying an
ancient doctrine in a modem context. Dickson J.'s judgment is very
well-reasoned and logical and certainly not lacking in an
appreciation of the problems that motivated Laskin C.J. to his
dissent. The distinction, which can only be found in their
Lordships' distinct views as to the role of the Supreme Court of
Canada, goes much deeper than social consciousness or a lack
thereof and is one that is likely to be evidenced in opinions of that
Court for sometime yet.
This, then, is how the matter stands in Nova Scotia at the
moment. It does not appear as though the Carswell case can be
distinguished in this province. True, there is no Petty Trespass Act
and it could be argued that the legislative commitment to collective
bargaining overrides the property rights of a shopping center owner
more readily in the absence of an express statutory provision. 173a
Similarly, there is no express retention of any rights in trespass
under the Trade Union Act. Nonetheless, it seems that Dickson J.'s
emphasis on property rights does go deeper than the fact that they
have been encompassed in a statutory framework. Accordingly,
173. Id. at 15,311; 5 N.R. at 534.
173a. But see the recent decision in Broadway Park Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Lakin,
[1976] 1 W.W.R. 44 (Sask. Q.B.).
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until the legislature acts one way or the other, which clearly it
should, trade unions must accept the concept of trespass as a very
real, albeit inappropriate, restriction on their otherwise legitimate
activities.
The decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Walker & Sons
Ltd. v. Groom, Robertson, LeRue, Gillis & Jollimore 74 should
prove more palatable to those in local union circles. The case arose
out of the organizing campaign conducted at the Lighthouse Tavern
last year. It will be remembered that certain employees were
dismissed by the employer. The former, along with members of the
Hotel, Restaurant & Bartenders Employees' Union then picketed
the premises of the employer and, indeed, had some success in
reducing the tavern's normal rate of business. The employer applied
for an exparte interim injunction which was granted by Dubinsky J.
but the same judge subsequently granted an application for
dissolution of the injunction by the employees.
Dubinsky J., in granting the application, made it quite clear that
he was in no way considering the merits of the case. Quite properly,
he felt that this was a matter for the trial judge and that his sole duty
was to consider the continuance of the ex parte injunction. The
important thing, however, is that despite the lack of any
investigation of the merits of the case, Dubinsky J. evidenced a
refreshing approach in analysing the issue of whether even a prima
facie case existed.
His Lordship initially considered the question whether there had
been any breach of a provincial or federal statute which would, of
course, have tainted the picketing; no such illegality was found. He
then turned to the issue of whether the plaintiff's legal rights had
been violated in any other way and came to the conclusion that it
had not been demonstrated "by a preponderance of credible
evidence, that an actionable wrong had been done to the
plaintiffs". 175 The picketing was peaceful at all times and witnesses
reported there had been no disturbances; for example, there was no
evidence of patrons having difficulties entering the tavern. 176 In
fact, the picketers appear to have gone to extraordinary lengths to
avoid any element of illegality. 177
174. Unreported decision of Dubinsky J. delivered June 2, 1975. Supplementary
reasons handed down on June 8, 1975, S.H. No. 6923.
175. Id. at5.
176. Id.
177. Id. Indeed, the picketers refused an interview with a reporter because the

latter's car was parked on the employer's property.

Recent Developments in Labour Law in Nova Scotia 843

It has never been in doubt since the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants178 that
there has been a theoretical right to picket peacefully in this country.
This right has, however, been substantially abrogated by courts
which had tended to assume a breach of some legal right, thus
finding some illegality to taint otherwise legal picketing, and to
decide that on the balance of convenience less harm would be done
if an injunction was issued against the union. 179 Two passages from
the judgment of Dubinsky J. are indicative of his Lordship's more
precise and realistic approach. First, with respect to the effect of the
picket line:
As Mr. Justice Rand said in the Aristocratic Restaurants case,
supra, I would also say that experience has proven that, insofar
as these labour controversies are concerned, what is blazoned or
written on placards has long ceased to have an intimidating effect
on the average individual. Even certain off-colour words which
one would certainly not use in polite company, no longer cause
the offence which was the case with such words years ago ....
In short, all of us in this day and age are inclined
to take placards
80
and language of this sort "in our stride". 1
Secondly, as to the evidence necessary to sustain an injunction:
That the tavern's business went down, there is hardly any doubt.
Such is generally the case whenever pickets are set up, but after
the first few days, during which time there is bound to be some
hestitation on the part of a labour-oriented public, things
frequently return practically to normal. But irrespective of
whether such will be the case with the plaintiff's Lighthouse
Tavern, the fact is that a Court must only exercise that
extraordinary remedy of injunction with extreme caution. The
Court must not be asked merely to assume that legal rights are
being interfered with and violated. The Court must be shown, by
a preponderance of evidence, that such, indeed, has been the
case. 181
Two final points might be made, however, which tend to cloud
any initial favourable impression this case gives. First, it must be
remembered that this was an interlocutory hearing and that
Dubinsky J. had earlied granted the ex parte application. Even
bearing in mind the issue of speed which is inherent in such
178. [1951]S.C.R. 762; [195113D.L.R. 769.
179. See E. Palmer, The Short Unhappy Life of the "Aristocractic" Doctrine
(1960), 13 U. Toronto L.J. 189.

180. S.H. No. 6923 at4.
181. Id. at6.
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applications and the general inadequacy before the Court at this
stage, one wonders how such evidence could give rise to the
conclusion that there was even a primafacie case for breach of the
plaintiff's legal rights. In granting the initial order, Dubinsky J. has
therefore laid himself open to all the criticism normally directed at
the role of the judiciary in this area of the law. More importantly, s
40 of the Judicature Act expressly limits the power to grant ex parte
injunctions in Labour-management disputes unless:
• . . the Court.

.

. is satisfied that the case is a proper one for the

granting of an injunction and
(a) a breach of the peace, an interruption of an essential public
damage to property has
service, injury to persons or18 severe
2
occurred or is about to occur;
It is difficult, from the evidence available at the interlocutory
hearing, to see how by any stretch of the imagination any of the
alternatives in s. 40(3)(a) could have been satisfied. Section 40 was
enacted to restrict the granting of ex parte injunctions and was an
admission of their potential for abuse, at least in the field of labour
relations. Even admitting the present section's inadequacies, it is
disappointing to see both the intent and terminology of the provision
apparently ignored with the consequent return to the vagaries of the
common law.
Secondly, it would be well to bear in mind that the present case
involved a very special factual situation. None of the picketeers were
employees of the plaintiff. Accordingly, there was no question on
the facts of their being in breach of the strike provisions of the Trade
Union Act. Had this not been the case, the picketing would quite
clearly have been illegal, tainted by those provisions in the Act
which prohibit collective action during an organizing campaign.
VI. Administration of the Collective Agreement
1. The Collective Agreement and Individual Contract of Employment

One of the most confusing areas of labour law in Nova Scotia and
Canada generally involves the relationship which the individual
contract of employment bears to the collective agreement entered
into by the union on behalf of the employees and the employer. The
historical view that the collective agreement was not incorporated
182. S.N.S. 1972, c. 2, s. 40(3) (a).
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into the individual contract 183 has been discredited largely since the
84
advent of modem industrial relations legislation in this country.1
Currently, two views might be said to be in vogue. The first
characterizes the collective agreement as being virtually identical
with the individual contract, with only the act of hiring remaining
outside the scope of the former. 185 The second takes the view that
86
some, but not all, of the terms of the agreement are incorporated. '
Integrally connected with this question is the very practical problem
of when, if ever, the employee may have recourse to the Courts to
enforce the collective agreement or his individual contract of
employment. A recent decision of Jones J. in the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court is worthy of note in that it provides some assistance
in assessing the likely approach of the Courts to the problem in this
province.
In Downey v. Scotia Square Hotel Ltd. 18 7 the plaintiff, an
employee of the defendant, had commenced an action for wrongful
dismissal. The defendant relied, inter alia, on the fact that the
plaintiff was a party to a collective agreement which contained
grievance procedures covering disputes, including those arising
over dismissals. Accordingly, the defendant maintained that the
plaintiff should have had recourse to the collective agreement and
was barred from bringing the action. It also appears that although
some discussion of the plaintiff's case had taken place informally
between the union and the employer, neither the plaintiff nor the
union had actually presented any grievance to the employer under
the terms of the collective agreement.
Jones J. upheld the defendant's argument. Relying on the
decision in Syndicat Catholique des Employ~s des Magasins de
Quebec, Inc. v. Compagnie Paquet Lt,e., 188 to the effect that the
terms of employment are governed by the collective agreement and
s. 39 of the Trade Union Act which makes the collective agreement
binding on employees, his Lordship decided that the plaintiff must
utilize the grievance procedure laid down therein. 18 91n reaching this
183. See Young v. CanadianNorthern Railway, [1931]A.C. 83; [1931] 1 D.L.R.

645 (P.C.) (Man.).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 39.
C.P.R. v. Zambri, [19621S.C.R. 609; 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654.
Infra, note 192.
Unreported. S.H. No. 04733.
(19591 S.C.R. 206; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346.
S.H. No 04733 at 6.
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conclusion Jones J. expressly followed his earlier decision in Caines
v. Cape Breton Development Corporation.190 Unfortunately, his
Lordship makes no attempt to clarify the problems raised by his
judgment in the Caines decision; indeed he possibly accentuates
them. Accordingly, a brief discussion of that case should not be out
of order.
In Caines, two employees of the defendant corporation were
dismissed when they refused to perform certain tasks which both the
company and the union had advised them to perform. The report of
the case is not clear on the crucial issue of whether or not the
employees approached the union to take their grievance and whether
or not they were refused. However, the judge was satisfied that the
employees had failed to pursue the grievance procedure which
raised fairly and squarely the issue of whether or not they would be
able to have recourse to the courts in an action for wrongful
dismissal. There being no question but that the employees were
bound by the collective agreement the issue then became simply one
of whether the availability of the grievance procedure estopped the
plaintiffs from bringing this indpendent action.
The basis of Jones J.'s decision in the Caines case is clearly laid
down in the following passage:
While it is not made abundantly clear in the Canadian decisions,
the real crux of the matter is the interpretation of the provisions of
the statute. In my view the provisions of s. 19 of the Industrial
Relations and Disputes Act are clear. Having regard to the
language used, it was the intention of Parliament to resolve
disputes arising out of collective agreements through a process of
arbitration or similar procedure. It is difficult to envisage more
explicit language than that used in ss. (3): "Every party . . .
shall comply with the provisions for final settlement contained in
the agreement and give effect thereto."
In most instances employees gain benefits under collective
agreements, including job security, far in excess of any rights at
common law. The object of the legislation is to provide for the
expeditious settlement of disputes without work stoppages,
primarily by the parties to the agreement. This can be done by
avoiding judicial proceedings and resorting to tribunals of the
parities' own choosing. In my view this is the predominant
opinion of the Canadian cases to which I have referred.
In this case the plaintiffs rely on the agreement as establishing
the terms of employment. In doing so they are bound by the
grievance procedures set out in the contract. It is significant that
190. (1973), 39 D.L.R. (3d) 606 (N.S.S.C., T.D.).
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the agreement contains provisions by which an individual
employee can express his grievance. The plaintiffs were bound to
exhaust the grievance procedures before proceeding to Court.
The Court has no jurisdiction to try these actions at this time. 19 1
On a superficial level these comments are perfectly consistent
with the trend of Canadian authority which is to accept jurisdiction
where this would only require the enforcement of a right already
ascertained under the collective agreement but to deny it where the
matter involves a question relating to the interpretation of the
agreement. 192 There are, however, several important points arising
out of this passage. First, his Lordship appears to be justifying the
necessity of recourse to the collective agreement because the
plaintiffs relied on the terms of the collective agreement as setting
out their contract of employment. 1 93 This raises the interesting
question of what the response of Jones J. would have been had the
plaintiffs not relied on the collective agreement but on some
additional and independent common law right. For example,
suppose the employees had been dismissed with inadequate
common law notice and the collective agreement contained no
provisions regarding such notice. Could the employees have come
directly to court to seek a remedy in damages? Obviously, this
would be an extremely unusual situation; nevertheless the situation
could arise. The Downey decision is of no assistance in answering
the question as it is unclear whether or not the plaintiff was relying
on the "just cause" provision but presumably this was the case.
One can only speculate, then, and one's answer will depend entirely
on to what extent the collective agreement is regarded as solely
representing the individual contract of employment; in other words,
has the common law right of notice been subordinated to the
additional rights given to employees under the collective agreement.
Secondly, Jones J. places considerable emphasis on the fact that
the plaintiffs could individually express their grievances under the

191. Id. at 616-617.
192. See, inter alia, Re Grottoli v. Lock & Son Ltd., [1963] 2 O.R. 254; 39
D.L.R. (2d) 128 (H.C.); Hamilton Street Railway Co. v. Northcott, [1967] S.C.R.
3; 58 D.L.R. (2d) 708; Close v. Globe and Mail Ltd., [1967] 1 O.R. 235; 60
D.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.); Ford v. Trustees of the Ottawa Civic Hospital, [1973] 3
O.R. 437; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 169 (H.C.). Compare Wood v. Miramichi Hospital
(1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 290; 52 M.P.R. 282 (N.B.C.A.); Logan v. Board of
School Trustees (1973), 6 N.B.R. (2d) 782; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 152 (C.A.).
193. Supra, note 191.
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procedure laid down in the collective agreement. 19 4 This
immediately suggests that had the plaintiffs not had individual
recourse to the procedure his Lordship might have reached a
different conclusion. Certainly, this view is borne out in his
judgment in Downey. 195 Ignoring the fact that it does not appear as
though the plaintiffs had a right to present their grievance
individually, it is suggested that this approach is incorrect. Under
the Trade Union Act the union is given exclusive rights to represent
the employee; 196 the employees are bound by the terms of the
collective agreement and if that agreement states that the union is
responsible for bringing any grievance then surely the employees
are bound by that term. To permit the individual to resort to the
courts simply because he had no individual right to process his
grievance would be to strike at the very foundation of arbitration as
the final settlement procedure for disputes over interpretation of the
collective agreement. Moreover, for a court to accept jurisdiction in
this situation would be to fly in the teeth of the weight of authority
insisting that the courts should not become involved in interpreting
197
such agreements.
Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, is his Lordship's
comment that the plaintiffs must exhaust the grievance procedure
and that the Court had no jurisdiction "at this time."' 198 Do these
last words indicate that Jones J. would have been willing to hear the
action if the grievance procedure had not proved satisfactory to the
plaintiffs. It appears clear that once a decision is handed down by an
arbitrator the employee is bound by that decision. 199 But what if,
for example, the union executive bona fide refused to take his case
past the second stage of the grievance procedure? There is little
Canadian authority on point; what there is suggests that an
individual has no independent rights 20 0 and, it is submitted, quite
rightly so. As Adell 20 1 put very succintly:
194. Id.
195. InDowney, S.H. No. 04733, Jones I. distinguishes Logan v. Board of School
Trustees (1973), 6 N.B.R. (2d) 782; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 152 on this basis.

196. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 25.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Supra, note 192.
Supra, note 191.
Caven v. C.P.R., [1925] 3 D.L.R. 841 (P.C.) (Alta.).
Bisson v. Brotherhoodof Railway Carmen of America and CanadianCar Co.

(1962), 63 C.L.L.C. 15,469.
201. B. Adell, The Legal Status of Collective Agreements (Kingston: Industrial

Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1970).
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When the union's decision not to process a grievance is reached
in good faith and on the basis of the merits of the grievance, then
the union is performing its proper function as bargaining agent,
and it would be inimical to the successful operation of the
the individual to force the union to
grievance procedure to20allow
2
process his agreement.
One might add that such a conclusion would also be quite contrary
to the intent of the legislation which is to provide arbitration as a
means of final settlement. It is not envisaged that every grievance
must go through this far and that they may not be settled at an earlier
stage of the procedure by the employer and the union. Indeed, it is
not yet established in Nova Scotia whether there is even any right of
court action where the union has acted in bad faith in refusing to
process the agreement. 20 3 Certainly, the American courts have
permitted an action based on the collective agreement where there
has been a breach of the duty of fair representation owed by the
union, but this question has hardly been touched upon by Canadian
courts. 20 4 Nor is this the time to investigate the matter further.
None of the above questions are answered in Downey and to this
extent then the law is still very uncertain in Nova Scotia. One
definite result, however, of reading Downey and Caines together is
that, at the very least, an employee bound by and relying on a
collective agreement must "exhaust" any grievance procedure
under that agreement before commencing an action independently
in the courts. In what situation Jones J. and the Nova Scotia Courts
would be prepared to accept jurisdiction will have to be settled
subsequently. With respect, that jurisdiction should be as narrow as
possible. While permitting individual recourse to the courts may
provide an equitable response in some cases, the writers view such
an approach as inconsistent with the concept of a settlement
procedure independent from the courts, the legislative intent to
remove the interpretation of collective agreements from that arena
and the constitution of the union as exclusive bargaining agent of
the employees.

202. Id. at 216.
203. But compare Fisher v. Pemberton (1970), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521; 72 W.W.R.

575 (B.C.S.C.).
204. See L. Carr, The Development of the Duty of Fair Representation in Ontario
(1968), 6 Osgoode Hall L.J. 281; B. Adell, The Duty of Fair Representation:
Effective Protectionfor Individual Rights in Collective Agreements (1970), 25 Ind.

Rel. 602.
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2. Arbitration

The Trade Union Act of Nova Scotia is divided into two parts;
Part II which deals with the construction industry and Part I which
deals with the other areas of labour law which fall within the
competence of the province. The difference with respect to the
review of awards made by arbitrators under the respective parts of
the Act is at least in theory very important. Section 40, in Part I,
states that the parities to a collective agreement must provide:
a provision for final settlement without stoppage of work, by
arbitrationor otherwise...

The phrase "by arbitration or otherwise" is, of course, the classic
formula which the courts have deemed to indicate a "consensual"
arbitrator. 20 5 Section 103(1), in Part II, contains only the words "to
arbitration". This terminology is now accepted as establishing a
20 6
'statutory'' arbitrator.
Two consequences would seem to flow from this distinction.
First, while certiorari will always be available in appropriate
circumstances to quash an award of a statutory arbitrator, it is well
established that certiorariwill not lie against a private or consensual
award. 20 7 Thus, where the award of a Part I arbitrator is at issue, the
appropriate manner to proceed for review in Nova Scotia would
appear to be by way of the Arbitration Act. Of course, in the case of
a Part II arbitration, certiorariis available.
Secondly, one must have regard to what is commonly called the
very question" doctrine. While the scope of misconduct under s.
13(2) of the Arbitration Act has been construed widely and includes
an error of law on the face of the record, 20 8 historically the courts
will not interfere where the question of law concerned is the very
thing referred to the consensual arbitrator. Having submitted the
205. Howe Sound Co. v. International Union of Mine and Mill and Smelter
Workers (Canada), Local 663, [1962] S.C.R. 318; 33 D.L.R. (2d) 1; R. v. Board
of Arbitration, Ex parte Cumberland Railway Company (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d)
135 (N.S.C.A.).
206. R. v. Barber, Ex Parte Warehousemen's and MiscellaneousDrivers' Union,

[1968] 2 O.R. 245; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 682 (C.A.).
207. Supra, note 205.
208. Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. Nova Scotia Quarryworkers' Union, Local
294, CLC (1960), 20 D.LR. (2d) 319; 43 M.P.R. 310 (N.S.S.C., in banco); Re
Canadian Keyes Fibre Co. Ltd. v. United Paperworkers International Union,
Local 576 (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 81; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 305 (S.C., A.D.); Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 9-832 v. Canadian
GeneralElectric Co. Ltd., unreported S.H. No. 04491.
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matter for final determination in this forum, the parties to the
collective agreement are bound by the arbitrator's decision on that
point. The point is well put by the Lord Chancellor in Kelantan
Government v. Duff Development Company:

No doubt an award may be set aside for an error of law appearing
on the fact of it; and no doubt a question of construction is
(generally speaking) a question of law. But where a question of
construction is the very thing referred for arbitration, then the
decision of the arbitrator upon that point cannot be set aside by
the Court only because
the Court would itself have come to a
20 9
different conclusion.
This theoretical immunity from review does not, however, apply to
statutory arbitrators.
On the other hand from very early times the courts have
employed the remedy of certiorari to correct errors of law
appearing on the face of the proceedings of statutory boards and
tribunals of all kinds having legal authority to determine
questions affecting the right of subjects and having the duty to act
judicially .

.

. The control over such bodies exercised by the

Courts through the remedy of certiorari has never been
circumscribed by the rule in the consensual cases...210
Recent cases have demonstrated, however, that from a practical
point of view the "very question" doctrine has ceased to be
meaningful except in extreme cases. One would expect to find, for
example, at the very least a discussion of the principle in Part I
arbitration cases. This, however, has not been the case. When one
compares the decision of the Nova Scotia Appellate Division in Re
Otis Elevator Co. and Union of Elevator Constructors,2 11 a Part II
arbitration, with more recent decisions involving consensual
awards, 2 12 the courts appear to be treating the question of whether
there has been an error of law on the face of the record in identical
fashion. No mention is made in either line of cases of the ability of
the Court to interfere with the consensual arbitrator's decision on
209. [1923] A.C. 395 at 409 (H.L.).
210. R. v.Barber, Ex Parte Warehousemen's and Miscellaneous Drivers Union,
[1968] 2 0.R. 245 at 249; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 682 at 686.
211. (1971), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 437; 22 D.LR.(3d)709.
212. See supra, note 208 and Re Maritime Employers Association and
InternationalLongshoremen's Association, Local 269, Port of Halifax, unreported
S.H. No. 05282. However, the recent decision of Macntosh J. in International
Union, UAW, Local 720 v. Volvo CanadaLtd. Manufacturing Division, S.H. No.
08384 at 8-9 clearly amounts to a generous affirmation of the "very question"
doctrine in Canada. Its long term effects remain to be seen.
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the particular question put to him for determination. It may be that
issue did not arise in any of the decisions or it may be that the Nova
Scotia courts do not feel that the doctrine applies where review of
the arbitrator's award is sought by way of the Arbitration Act.
Whatever the reason for the absence of any discussion, it is clear
that the courts in this province have not accepted the distinction.
Until the matter is finally decided it cannot, however, be regarded
as settled.
One doubts, nevertheless, whether acceptance of the distinction
in Nova Scotia would have an practical effect on the ability of the
courts to set aside consensual awards. In the first place, in recent
times there has not been any pronounced willingness on the part of
the courts to set aside awards on the basis of error of law. As
McKeigan C.J. stated in CanadianKeyes Fibre Co. Ltd. v. United
PaperworkersInternationalUnion, Local 576213
An arbitration board does not exceed its jurisdiction or commit
reviewable error of law merely because it interprets a clause in a
collective agreement differently than would the appeal court so
long as its interpretation
is one which the language of the clause
2 14
will reasonably bear.
Secondly, the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent case of The
Metropolitan Toronto Police Association v. The Metropolitan
Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police2 15 has so limited the
"very question" doctrine that it will likely have no effect in by far
the majority of arbitrations. In this case, the appellant Association
had claimed that the employer was in breach of the collective
agreement by reason of stopping the dues payroll deduction for six
members of the Association. This specific question, which
necessitated a decision on the meaning and proper construction of
the agreement, was put to an arbitrator. The Supreme Court, Laskin
C.J. and Spence J. dissenting, found that this was not a case where
the "very question" doctrine would protect a consensual arbitrator:
In my opinion, the present case is not one in which the parties by
agreement "ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts to determine a
question of law by choosing to have the question determined by a
judge of their own making." The question of law which arose in
the arbitration came up in the course of a consideration of a
grievance in the ordinary way under the provisions of the
collective agreement.
213. (1974),8N.S.R.(2d)81;44D.L.R.(3d)305.
214. Id. at 87; 44 D.L.R. (3d) at 310.
215. [1975] S.C.R. 630; 45 D.L.R. (3d) 548.
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There was here no joint submission by the parties to the
arbitrator, seeking to have a specific question of law determined
for them

. .

. [The] issue came before the arbitrator by virtue of

the provisions of the collective agreement governing the
processing of all grievances. Its solution certainly involved a
consideration of the construction of the agreement, but the
submission to the arbitrator was to be determined on the basis of
the true meaning of the agreement. The parties had not bound
of the arbitrator's
themselves to an unqualified acceptance
216
decision as to what the agreement meant.
When one combines this decision with the earlier case of Bell
Canada v. Office and Professional Workers Employees' International Union, 2 17 it becomes readily apparent that the question put to
the arbitrator will have to be the following specificity: e.g. "What
does clause X mean?", before the doctrine can have any
applicability at all. Indeed, the general tenor of the Supreme Court
majority judgment, which would seem in any case to require a
decision by the arbitrator which is "consistent with the agreement"
may well eliminate the "very question" doctrine completely.
Moving to the more specific, there is only one recent arbitration
decision in Nova Scotia that necessitates any comment at length. In
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union, Local
9-832 v. Canadian General Electric Co., 21 8 the Nova Scotia
Appellate Division was asked to set aside the award of a Part I
arbitration board. The latter had found that the grievor, who had had
a history of alcoholism, had been improperly discharged as the
evidence failed to disclose the measure of reasonable and just cause
necessary to support the dismissal. A period of suspension had been
substituted. Jones J., quashed the award on the basis that the
arbitration board had failed to deal with the question which was
before it and had therefore committed an error of law which was
apparent on the face of the record. This decision was then appealed
by the union to the Appellate Division.
The respondent employer's basic submission was that there was a
distinction to be made between discharge for disciplinary reasons
and discharge that has nothing to do with the employee's
misconduct. 219 MacDonald J.A., delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, accepted this analysis:
216. Id. at 657; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 568.

217. [1974]S.C.R. 335; 37 D.L.R. (3d) 561.
218. Unreported, March 7, 1975, S.H. No. 04491.
219. Id. at 13.
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It seems obvious to me that there must be a distinction between
the discharge of an employee for disciplinary reasons on the one
hand and for non disciplinary reasons on the other. Assuming that
the words "reasonable and just cause" in Article 4 [of the
collective agreement] apply to both types of discharge, surely
different considerations arise. If the discharge arises from the
exercise of the administrative functions and is based on medical
grounds only then the factors involved in the decision to
discharge would include those discussed in The University
Hospital of London and London and District Building Service
Workers Union, Local 220 (1973), 4 L.A.C. (2d) 16 at pp. 28-29
On the other hand, if the discharge is for disciplinary reasons
then the test of whether the company had "reasonable and just
cause" must be determined
within the framework of the
2 20
particular infraction.
This passage contains a very important distinction which had not
previously received judicial sanction in Nova Scotia. Arbitrators
will no longer be able to apply the one uniform test of whether the
arbitration was "reasonable and just" in all the circumstances of the
case at hand. Rather they will have to classify initially the discharge
as being either disciplinary or non-disciplinary in nature and then
apply the appropriate test.
MacDonald J. A. then proceeded to characterize the issue submitted
to the arbitration board as being whether the respondent company
had reasonable and just cause to dismiss the greivor as being
medically unfit for employment. 22 1 He concluded from the award
that the Board had characterized the issue before it incorrectly as
involving a discharge for disciplinary reasons when "what was
2 22
before it was a discharge imposed for non disciplinary reasons:"
Hence, the Board had erred in substituting a suspension for
discharge when there was no infraction of any relevant rule or
regulation and the issue became one of what effect this error had.
His Lordship found that there was no reviewable error of law on the
face of the record but that the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction
and, therefore, misconducted itself within s. 13(2) of the Arbitration
Act:
• . .the Board assumed an authority not given to it by the parties

220. Id. at 14-15.

221. Id. at 15.
222. Id. at 16.
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and thereby acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction when
it
2 23
exercised a disciplinary power not intended by the parties.
The apparent willingness of the Appellate Division to determine
of its own accord both the question put to the Board by the parties
and the Board's view of what that question was may cause some
justifiable concern. Nevertheless, the real importance of the Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers' case is the lesson it gives to
arbitrators; viz. how lack of clarity in drafting the award may get a
board into problems. It is clear from the award that the arbitration
board did consider the grievor's medical state and concluded that it
was no such as to prevent him performing his work satisfactorily.
Despite the reluctance of the Appellate Division to reach such a
conclusion, it appears reasonably evident from the reasons given in
the award that, even had the discharge been viewed solely as
non-disciplinary, the Board would not have accepted the evidence
of the company doctor as sufficient to justify discharge. By not
stating clearly this conclusion as the basis for its decision the Board,
in effect, got itself into trouble.
Certainly, this decision is going to require increased clarity from
arbitrators; this is particularly so in light of the broad terminology
used in most grievances. Assume, for example, that employee X is
discharged by the company and the union files a grievance alleging
"discharge without cause" as was the case in the present decision.
The union claims that X has been disciplined while the employer
states that the sole reason for dismissal was non-disciplinary.
Presumably, the arbitrator may determine on the evidence available
which explanation of the company's action is more probable and
assess the discharge on that basis. So long as this initial step is taken
any decision on the facts will normally be unimpeachable. Unless,
however, it is clearly stated in the award that this assessment is
being made, it is clear from this decision that the Court will feel
quite free to make its own determination of the question before the
Board.
VII. ConstructionIndustry
1. Accreditation
One of the major changes effected by the revision of the Trade
Union Act 224 was the provisions relating to the accreditation of
223. Id. at 18.
224. S.N.S 1972, c. 19.
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employers' organizations. The notion that accreditation was worthy
of legislative recognition was formed as a result of the work of Dean
H. W. Arthurs and Dr. J.H.G. Crispo, 2 25 and more directly in the
Nova Scotia context, following the Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into Industrial Relations in the Nova Scotia Construction
Industry.22 6 To date, the Construction Industry Panel of the Nova
Scotia Labour Relations Board has had to deal with four
applications for accreditation. What follows is a brief analysis of the
developments thus far.
(a). Appropriateness of the Unit - The Sector Applied For.
The first application for accreditation was filed by the Canadian
Automatic Sprinkler Association (CASA) on March 7, 1974. CASA
applied for a unit consisting of:
all unionized employers, employing sprinkler fitters and their
apprentices, in the industrial and commercial, housebuilding and
sewers, tunnels and watermains sectors of the construction
industry on the mainland of Nova Scotia.
In a written decision dated July 15, 1974 the Panel dismissed the
2 27
application.
The basis of the Panel's decision was that the unit applied for was
inappropriate for accreditation. The Panel held that s. 94 of the Act
does not contemplate accreditation for a group of employers which
does not constitute a sector within s. 89(h) of the Act. The unit
sought was not a unit consisting of all unionized employers in a
sector and geographic area as required by the Act, but rather
consisted of a unit of all unionized employers engaged in a
particular trade within a sector and area. However, the Panel did
indicate that the mere fact that the section applied for was not for all
employers in one of the four sectors enumerated in the Act did not
preclude the Panel from hearing the application in light of the
concluding words of s. 89(h) which authorized the Panel to
determine "any other sector" in addition to those specially
enumerated. In the instant case the Panel concluded that the
proposed unit could not be legitimized by determining that another
sector existed.
225. H. Arthurs and J. Crispo, "Countervailing Employer Power: Accreditation of
Contractor Associations" in H.C. Goldenberg and J.G.H. Crispo, eds.,
ConstructionLabour Relations (Canadian Construction Association, 1968) at 376.

226. Halifax, 1970 (herinafter cited as the Woods Report).
227. L.R.B. No. 332c.
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In so deciding the Panel outlined the factors which it would
consider in deciding whether to exercise its discretion under s.
89(h). These factors are as follows:
(a) whether any additional sector could be clearly definable in terms
which would distinguish the empoloyers therein from other
employers, (b) whether the addition of a new sector would be in the
express interests of the employers and the union and (c) that sectors
should be broadly defined and not specific as to trade and the Panel
would thus be unwilling to carve up the existing sectors. The panel
observed that if factors (a) and (b) were the only considerations,
discretion under s. 89(h) might well have been exercised. However,
in view of factor (c) and the fact that the employers involved
operated mainly in the commercial and industrial sector, the Panel
refused to find another sector. To do so would, in the opinion of the
Panel, defeat the purpose of the legislation which was multi-trade
22 8
bargaining in the construction industry.
At first sight the Panel may have gone too far. It can be argued
forcibly that multi-trade bargaining is not the aim of accreditation
but the result. The real intent of accreditation would appear to be to
give statutory recognition to employers' organizations in order to
offset a perceived imbalance in power between the unions and
employers in the industry. By the enactment of the accreditation
legislation it was hoped that this imbalance could be eliminated and
increased stability achieved. Looked at in this light, if it is true, as
the Panel implied, that the unit was in the express interests of the
parties then it would seem as though the Panel would have been
justified in exercising its discretion under s. 89(h). This approach
overlooks one very important point. If the interests of the parties
were to be the predominant factor in determining sectors then there
would hardly have been any need for the new legislation;
presumably these interests are reflected in current bargaining
patterns. The legislation was, therefore, enacted to introduce new
bargaining patterns based on a multi-trade sector. Moreover, it is
clear from the provisions of ss. 94 and 95 that the legislation is
designed to have a coercive effect; coercive not only in the sense of
individual employers within a trade who may want to bargain on
their own behalf but also in the sense of whole trades which fall
within a larger sector. All must become part of the accredited
organization. In the last resort, one might well ask why the sectors
228. Id.
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in s. 89(h) were defined so broadly if this was not the intent of the
legislation. To cut up the various sectors by permitting new
divisions such as that suggested by CASA would be to nullify that
intent.
The second application for accreditation was made by the
Boilermaker's Contractors Association of Nova Scotia (BCA) on
March 20, 1974. The unit applied for consisted of
all unionized employers employing employees engaged in
boilermaking, field construction, erectors, rigging, field fabrication, unloading, and work involving assembling and dismantling
in the industrial and commercial, housebuilding and sewers,
tunnels and watermains sectors of the construction industry on
the mainland of Nova Scotia.
This application was also dismissed. 229 It needs only a brief glance
at the proposed unit to indicate that it was defective in the same way
2 30
as the CASA application.
(b). Status of the Empoyers' Organization
The third application for accreditation was made by the
Construction Association Management Labour Bureau (CAMLRB).
This application was dismissed on the basis of s. 94(8) of the
Act. 23° a However, in the course of its decision the Panel offered
some useful comments on the issues which face an applicant for
accreditation.
The first requirement of an application is that it proves that it is an
"employers' organization" within the definition in s. 89(5). By
virtue of s. 89(f) an employer is any person who (i) employs or in
the preceding twelve months has employed more than one employee
and (ii) who operates a business in the construction industry. The
same section in s.s. (e) defines an employee as a person employed
229. L.R.B. No. 333c.
230. The BCA application was dismissed not as the result of a determination that
the unit was inappropriate but on the motion of one of the intervenors, the
Construction Association Management Labour Relations Bureau Ltd. Counsel for
the BCA requested that the hearing be adjourned until he had time to examine the
Panel's decision in the CASA application. The Panel had not reduced that decision
to writing. The Panel was prepared to give counsel the thrust of the decision and to
grant a one day adjournment to him to consider it. This was rejected by counsel for
BCA whereupon he withdrew from the hearing. Counsel for the Bureau then
moved that the application be dismissed and that motion was granted. Both CASA
and BCA appealed to the Trial Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court but
Cowan C.J. dismissed the applications. See S.H. No. 05071 and S.H. No. 05072,
handed down December 11, 1974, and (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 36.
230a. L.R.B. No. 293c.
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in the construction industry. The Panel found that the applicant
satisfied these definitions.
The second hurdle which an applicant for accreditation must
surmount is contained in s. 94(8) of the Act. In effect this
subsection has two requirements. First, the Panel must satisfy itself
that the organization is properly constituted and controlled by its
members. It is on this basis that the present application was
dismissed. Secondly, the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of
the Panel that each of the members of the applicant has vested
appropriate authority in it to enable it to discharge the
23
responsibilities of an accredited bargaining agent. 1
The final preliminary point is that the Panel made it very clear in
the present application that it would be very reluctant "to accredit
an employer's organization to bargain on behalf of any employer
23 2
who could not, if he wished, join the accredited organization."
As noted earlier, the Panel dismissed the CAMLRB application
for failure to comply with s. 94(8) (a). The Panel felt that the
memorandum and articles of association of the Bureau were
deficient in that (i) they did not guarantee that every member of the
Bureau had a vote in the election of the Board of Directors, (ii) there
was no guarantee that each member would be represented by a
director, (iii) the Board of Directors had unfettered power to change
the basis of the election of future directors, (iv) the Board, by
special resolution, could remove any director from office and (v)
there was no provision for a mandatory annual general meeting. The
Panel recommended changes which would recognize that a change
in the basis of the election of directors should be authorized by
special resolution, all members should be entitled to be represented
on the Board by a director and that an annual general meeting should
be held not more than fifteen months after the last meeting with
adequate notice given to all members.
The concern of the Panel with the democratic basis of the
applicant is not without foundation. Accreditation places a great
231. This latter requirement can be fulfilled by statutory declarations from each

member of the applicant, drafted in terms of the section, and an indication that the
signatory is authorized to sign collective agreements on behalf of the member
employer. Under s. 94(8) (a) and s. 94(8) (b), failure to satisfy the former is more
important than failure to satisfy the latter. Section 94(9) gives the Panel the
discretion of either dismissing or postponing the application for failure to satisfy s.
94(8) (b). No such discretion exists in so far as s. 94(8) (a) is concerned - the
application must be dismissed.
232. See the discussion, supra.
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deal of control and power in the hands of the accredited organization
and adequate protection must be guaranteed to those covered by the
accreditation order. The need for protection is evident when one
appreciates the diverse and often conflicting interests involved.
Large and small, national and local, general and specialty
contractors may be covered by the same order. However, it must be
remembered that an accreditated organization must have the
delegated authority to function effectively in carrying out its
responsibilities. In attempting to balance these seemingly conflicting principles the Panel may have erred too far in the search for
internal democrary in insisting "that every member must at all times
be entitled to be represented on the Board by a director". In a small
unit such a formula might not cause any undue administrative
hardships but in a larger unit such as that contemplated by the
legislation the requirement could cause great ineffeciency. One
wonders whether in fact the Panel's approach really adds a great
deal to democracy within the CAMLRB. A better and more realistic
trade-off might have been merely to require that each member had
one and only one vote in the election of the Board. Or if the Panel
felt that one group of contractors with a community of interest might
outvote the remainder and thus elect a dominant slate, then some
system of cumulative voting as introduced in recent corporations
legislation could have provided a solution. 23 3 To a large extent, this
criticism of the Panel's approach depends on the administrative
structure within the Bureau. If day to day business and minor policy
decisions are placed in the hands of a small executive or
management committee while the Board acts only as a watchdog
and major policy maker, the present system should cause little
problem. If this is not the case, however, and the Board is intended
to play a more important role, it will be interesting to see how the
multitude of representatives affects its efficient functioning.
(c). Appropriateness of the Unit
The fourth application for accreditation was made by the
CAMLRB after appropriate changes had been made to the
memorandum and articles of association. The unit applied for
consisted of:
all unionized employers generally engaged in the industrial and
commercial sector of the construction industry on the mainland of
Nova Scotia.
233. CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 102.
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The Panel found this unit to be appropriate and then proceeded to
elaborate on its findings with respect to inclusions and exclusions
234
from the unit as follows:
(i). IndustrialPlantMaintenanceEmployers. The Panel excluded
from the unit employers engaged in industrial plant maintenance on
the ground that they do not operate a business in the construction
2 35
industry as defined in the Act.
(ii). Employers Engaged Partly in and Partly Out of the
Construction Industry. The Panel held that where an employer is
engaged in a business only partly in the construction industry then
he will lose his bargaining rights to the accredited organization only
in respect of his construction employees. His bargaining relationships with other employees will remain unaffected. In particular,
the Panel determined that companies involved in the installation,
repair and maintenance of elevators operate a business within the
Construction Industry in all but maintenance aspects of their
operation and thus would generally fall within the unit. Similarly,
the Panel held that it was constrained by the wording of s. 89(c) to
exclude employees with respect to their employees engaged in shop
or off-site work but including them where they had employees
engaged in on site work.
(iii). Unionized Employers. The third exclusion identified by the
Panel concerned those employers who were not "unionized
employers". The latter are defined as employers employing
unionized employees. 2 3 6 Unionized employees are those on whose
behalf a trade union has been "certified or recognized as bargaining
agent in accordance with section 28."237 The Panel noted that prior
to 1972 no formal mechanism of voluntary recognition existed.
However, the same requirement as now appears in s. 44 did exist
with respect to the necessity of filing a collective agreement with the
Minister of Labour. Accordingly, the Panel held that any employer
who, before or after 1972, voluntarily recognized a union as
bargaining agent and signed a collective agreement which was filed
with the Minister was a unionized employer. Failure to sign any
subsequent agreement was not deemed to render this negating. On
the other hand, an employer for whom no union had been certified
234. L.R.B. File No. 312.
235. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 89(c).

236. Id. at s. 89(k).
237. Id. at s. 89(j).
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and with respect to whom no agreement had even been filed is not a
unionized employer and therefore not encompassed by the
accreditation order.
(iv). The Scope of the Unit. The Panel also considered the
question of the extent to which it would carve up the sector applied
for by recognizing special interests on the part of various
employers. Consistent with its decision in the CASA application
the Panel was reluctant to accredit a unit of less than all unionized
employers in the sector. Specifically, the Panel declined to exclude
employers on the basis that they were unionized by unions who had
never bargained with the applicant; that they were accustomed to
bargaining with their unions on a national basis; or that they were
engaged in "heavy industrial" work and historically bargained on a
project basis.
More important, however, was the effect that ss. 23(3) and 95(5)
of the Act 23 8 had on accreditation. These sections provide that
where the employees of an employer are certified in accordance
with s. 23(1) of the Act, 23 9 the employer is not bound by any
accreditation order. Thus, the Panel was faced with a rather difficult
exercise in statutory interpretation. Section 95(5), read literally,
would seem to exclude any employer whose employees were
unionized by any craft union. Recognizing the absurd results that
would flow from this conclusion, the Panel did not apply this literal
interpretation. Rather, a commonsense approach was adopted. It
was held that the intent of ss. 23(3) and 95(5) was to exclude from
the scope of an accreditation order an industrial employer, some of
whose employees were represented by a craft union certified in
accordance with s. 23(1). The Panel determined that the
certification procedure in the Construction Industry are governed by
s. 92 of the Act and not by s. 23 and thus employees of an employer
in the construction industry would not fall within s. 23 at all. At the
same time, there is a technical problem with this approach because
s. 92, dealing with applications for certification by construction
unions, specifically provides that ss. 23 and 22 apply to such
applications. The Panel rationalized this problem by stating that the
238. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19.

239. This section permits the severance of a craft unit in a certification application
where the employees in question belong to a craft or group exercising technical

skills by reason of which they are distinguishable from the employees as a whole
and the majority of the group are members of one trade union pertaining to that
craft.
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inclusion of these sections in s. 92 was only for the purposes of the
timeliness of any application for certification. However, it requires
considerable stretching of the intent of s. 23 to bring it within this
rationale. Certainly, s. 22 is concerned with the timeliness of
applications by s. 23 appears to be almost solely connected with the
appropriateness of the unit. The only concern with timeliness is to
be found in s. 23(2) but this would seem to be inextricably
interwoven with the operation of s. 23(1).
Nevertheless, the conclusion reached by the Panel is completely
in accord with common sense and the intent of accreditation.
Sections 23(3) ard 95(5) would seem to be the result of an
overcautious draftsman. If one looks back to the definition of
"employer" in Part II of the Act, 240 it is found that he must operate
a business in the construction industry. Thus, accreditation only
affects such employers and industrial employers whose skilled
workers are organized by a craft union would not normally be
subject to any accreditation order even without these provisions.
Sections 23(3) and 95(5) are, therefore, to all intents and purposes
superfluous and cause nothing but confusion in the Act.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the Panel has adopted an
extremely responsible approach to the question of accreditation. Its
decisions will leave some practical problems, for example, the
question of how to deal with employees who sometimes work
within the sector or even the construction industry, and on other
occasions outside. However, as the Board stated in the second
CAMLRB decision, these problems of fluctuating duties can be
dealt with in the collective agreement. Accreditation has also been
very slow moving. The CAMLRB application has only very
recently been approved. 24 1 One gets the very strong impression that
certain groups in the construction industry do not subscribe to the
concept of accreditation at all and have been conducting to some
extent a delaying action. 24 2 All that can be said is that it is to be
hoped that these differences are ironed out by the time accreditation
really starts operating. Otherwise accreditation, viewed by its
proponents as the panacea for the construction industry, could
become an unmitigated disaster.
240. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 89(f).

241. Accreditation was granted to the CAMLRB on January 29, 1976. See L.R.B.
No. 392 C.
242. See, for example, the CASA and BCA applications to the Supreme Court,
supra, note 230 which in the writers' view appear frivilous to a large extent.
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2. JurisdictionalDisputes
The Trade Union Act does not attempt to solve jurisdictional
disputes in any positive fashion. Rather, the Act attempts the more
modest goal of ameliorating the worst aspect - the job shutdown.
In other words the Act makes no specific attempt to reorganize the
industry so as to prevent completely such disputes but seeks to
arbitrate jurisdictional problems before the parties are forced to
243
resort to economic action.
The Act defines a "jurisdictional dispute" as:
a dispute between two or more unions or between an employer or
employers' organization
and one or more unions over the
2
assignment of work. 44
In the event that "a person has reasonable grounds for believing and
does believe that a stoppage of work or any part of the work carried
on by one or more employers and employees represented by one or
more trade unions is likely to occur as the result of a jurisdictional
dispute" a complaint can be made to the Board. 24 5 The Board, after
satisfying itself that a stoppage of work is likely to occur as the
result of such a dispute, can issue an interim order assigning the
work to a specific trade or craft. Any of the parties involved in the
dispute can then apply to the Board for a review of the interim order
and the Board can confirm, vary or revoke the interim order. The
Board's orders, both interim and final, bind all the parties affected
by the dispute unless the parties agree amongst themselves in
writing on the assignment of work and file the agreement with the
Board or unless they submit the dispute to a tribunal or to arbitration
which renders a decision binding on the parties.
The Board has considered many jurisdictional disputed cases.
Most decisions have, however, followed the principles set down in
L.R.B. No. 239c. That case involved a dispute between the
Labourers' International Union and the Operative Plasterers' and
Cement Workers' International Union over the supply, place and
finish of concrete. There is not the available space to explain the
facts fully. Suffice to say that as the result of swift technological
changes culminating in the institution of supply, place and finish
243. It should be noted that the Act still contemplates economic warfare as the
result of jurisdictional disputes. (See S.N.S. 1972, c.19, s.50.) We are here
concerned only with s.49 of the Act which seeks to avoid such conflict.
244. S.N.S. 1972, c.19, s. 1()

(n).

245. Id. at s.50(l). Any reference to the Board should be taken to mean, insofar as
the construction industry is concerned, the Construction Industry Panel.
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contractors, the Labourers lost their jurisdiction in placing the
concrete, an area in which they had previously done all the work at a
time when such specialty contractors where unknown, to the
Plasterers who had acquired bargaining rights for employees of the
contractors. After some period of time the Labourers proceeded to
make a complaint pursuant to s. 50 and the Panel issued an interim
award awarding the disputed work to the Plasterers. 2 46 At the
formal hearing the Panel confirmed their interim order. Several
matters of importance where, however, discussed.
At the formal hearing, the Panel was faced with two preliminary
objections raised by the Operative Plasterers' Union. The first was
to the effect that s. 50 of the Act did not empower the Panel to
award the work to the Labourers because the respondent employer
did not employ any members of the latter union. The Panel correctly
rejected that argument on an interpretation of s. 50 and the
definition of jurisdictional dispute. 24 7 In effect, the Panel held that
s. 50(3) of the Act empowered it to award the work to "persons"
2 48
and not only to "employees."
The Second objection put forward was that the Panel should not
accept as sufficient to invoke these powers under s. 50, the mere
statement by an officer of the complainant union that he "has
reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that a stoppage of
the work in dispute is likely to occure." The argument was that if
such was the case any union would be free to go on "a shopping
tour" hoping to pick up additional work and thus extend their
jurisdiction. This could lead to instability in an otherwise stable
246. L.R.B. No 222C.
247. Supra, note 244.

248. The argument of counsel for the Operative Plasterers was based on the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board,
Exparte Bennet and Wright Ltd., [1968]2 O.R. 168; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 378 (C.A.)
which applied and followed the decision of McRuer C.J.H.C. in R. v. Orliffe, Ex
parte CanadianPittsburghIndustries Ltd., [1961] O.W.N. 223 (H.C.). Under the
old Ontario legislation (R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 66(1)) jurisdictional disputes were

referred to the Jurisdictional Disputes Commission. In order for a complaint to be
made to the Commission it had to be alleged either that a union had required an
employer to assign work or that an employer had assigned work to employees in
one union rather than another. In the Canadian Pittsburg case the judge held that
the use of the word "employees" restricted the application of the section to "those
disputes that arise with respect to the assignment of work by an employer among
those that are engaged on the work over which he has direction." This approach
was criticized severely in the Report of the Royal Commission on LabourManagement Relations in the Construction Industry (Toronto, 1962) which

recommended that the word "employees" be changed to "persons".
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situation. The Panel agreed with this argument and stated that
because the likelihood of a work stoppage was a:
necessary precondition of the Panel's power under section 50, it
on the
[the Panel] would be reluctant to invoke its power simply 249
strength of statements by the complainant union's officers.
Furthermore, the Panel chastized the labourers for its failure to
"make a serious attempt" to settle with the Plasterers and stated
that:
the complainant union in a jurisdictional dispute must make a
concerted effort to work matters out with the other parties
involved before making a complaint to the Panel. 250
In the instant case, however, there was evidence from a third party
that a work stoppage was likely to occur and the second objection
was, in the final analysis, dismissed.
The Panel's approach to the second problem is illumunating in
many respects. The theoretical basis for s. 50 stems from the
Woods' Report. 2 5 1 The Commission suggested that if appropriate
private dispute settlement machinery was available to the parties the
Panel should refuse jurisdiction. The legislation eventually passed
was a watered down version of the Commission's recommendation.
The latter was based on the premise that the parties could be
encouraged and indeed would be eager to devise their own dispute
settlement machinery. History and current practice have, however,
demonstrated that in Nova Scotia the parties are either unwilling or
unable to establish such a scheme. When viewed in this light the
Panel's admonition that a "serious attempt" or a "concerted
effort" be made by the parties to solve the dispute may, if carried
too far, undermine the Commissioner's observation that:
the important point is that this vexatious issue must be removed
from the area of illegal work stoppage action and submitted
process with binding authority which
solely to some form of 2due
52
the parties will respect.
The Panel's concern that the parties engage in discussion as a first
step is laudable. However, the practice in the industry indicates that
a complainant union will approach the employer as a first step, and, if
satisfaction is not forthcoming, then it will "wobble the job". In the
face of such practices rigid adherence to the Panel's formula could
249.
250.
251.
252.

L.R.B. No. 239 C.
Id.
Supra, note 226.
Supra, note 226 at 97.
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result in little, if any, decrease in the number of work stoppages. If
the Panel felt constrained by the "necessary precondition"
contained in s. 50 then it should attempt to have the section
amended to exclude it and include the power to award costs against
a union on a "shopping tour." Considering the practice in the
industry and the reliance placed by the parties on the Panel in
dispute situations it is suggested that there should rarely be a case
253
where the Panel refuses to hear a jurisdictional dispute.
After dismissing these preliminary points the Panel proceeded to
lay down the criteria it would generally use in considering such
cases. The factors which the Board will take into account are
basically those found in the information required to be filed with the
Board in a review of an interim order 254 and include: (a) any union
constitution; (b) any collective agreement; (c) any agreement or
understanding between trade unions as to their respective jurisdictions or work assignments; (d) any agreement or understanding
between a trade union and an employer as to work assignment; (e)
any decision of any tribunal respecting work assignment; (f) any
other document relating to the work in dispute and a statement as to
any area or trade practice relating to the work and pictures,
diagrams or drawings of the disputed work; (g) the nature of the
work (i.e. skills required and safety considerations), and (h) the
efficiency and economy of the employer's operation or the
construction industry as a whole.
In noting these factors the Panel pointed out emphatically that the
criteria listed above were not in order of any priority. However, it
does appear from subsequent cases that the overriding concern of
253. In L.R.B. No. 377 C, involving a dispute between the same unions and the

Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union the Panel indicated that its
approach had not modified too much from that described above. The Panel stated

that in a jurisdictional dispute situation, where none of the parties objects that a
work stoppage is not in fact likely to occur, then the complainant's allegation that
such a stoppage is imminent will be accepted. Where, however, there is an

objection along these lines the Panel "will require evidence going beyond the
simple allegation of the union seeking assignment of the work that its members are
likely to disrupt the job". Furthermore, the Panel fell back on its "serious attempt"
formula and indicated that the estimate of the employer as to the likelihood of a
work stoppage would be given considerable weight. Presumably, when an
employer, employer and union, or two unions complain the Panel will take action
One wonders whether, in the context of a single union complaining, the Panel's
insistence on self-help remedies by the parties does not evidence a reluctance to
recognize the realities of the situation in jurisdictional disputes and an overlegalistic
approach to the problem.
254. See Regulation 25 of the Regulations made pursuant to the Trade Union Act.
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the Panel has tended to be the efficiency and economy of the
employer's operation. 2 55 Once again, if carried to extremes this
approach may cause problems for the Panel, this time in terms of
credibility. Economy and efficiency are both employer-oriented. At
this point in time both management and labour readily submit to
decisions of the Panel because of its speed, specialist knowledge
and, above, all, objectivity in deciding jurisdictional issues. An
overemphasis on employer-oriented factors may, in the long run,
reduce labour's satisfaction with the Panel as an arbiter of such
disputes.
One final interesting aspect of the Panel's decision in this case
concerned the differences in wage rules between the disputant
unions. At the time of the dispute the Labourers were receiving
$4.30 per hour and the interested members of the Operative
Plasterers only $3.65. The Panel stated:
We do not think its appropriate to concern ourselves with the
relative wage rates or the fact that the Labourers' collective
agreement calls for overtime rates because these factors are
subject to change.
While not necessarily important in the instant case, if the Panel
meant the above to be a statement of principle applicable to all
cases, it is surely wrong. In making an assignment of work the
employer's primary concern is to have it done competently.
However, many skills in the construction industry are interchangeable and may be performed as well by one trade as another. In such
a case it is incomprehensible that an employer may not look to and
be guided by the relative wage rates of the crafts involved. By
opting for the lower-rated group the employer may very well
interrupt estabilished work patterns and jurisdictions. The fact that
wage rates can change is not a relevant consideration in refusing to
take cognizance of the relevant wage rates. In a proper case this
factor may be extremely important, not only from the point of view
of the initial assignment of work but also from the Panel's point of
view in deciding the case. This is particularly so when the Panel
appears to be relying more and more on the efficiency and economy
of the employer's operation as the primary factor in its decisions. 256
255. In this respect the Panel seems to have acted in a way not unlike other
tribunals charged with the responsibility of settling jurisdictional disputes. See
Labour Relations Law (2d ed. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's
University, 1974) at 52.
256. It should be mentioned that the decision of the Panel related only to the
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Apart from the above reservations the Panel appears to have
achieved admirable success in coping with jurisdictional disputes.
More important is the fact that both management and labour respect
the Panel and are generally happy with the Panel in this area. While
the legislation may not have succeeded in fostering a move by the
parties to establish their own dispute settlement machinery it has,
currently at least, taken jurisdictional disputes out of the realm of
illegal work stoppages for the most part.
respondent companies in their relations with the two disputant unions. The Panel
noted specifically that different considerations could apply where, for example, the
work was done by a general and not a specialty contractor. In other words, the
Panel was issuing a "job decision". The "job decision" approach, whereby only
those parties before the Panel are bound by the decision makes eminent good sense
in jurisdictional dispute situations. The construction industry is inherently prone to
rapid technological change and the "job decision" is designed to take account of
this. In addition, it protects historical work patterns which have lagged behind new
changes in the industry.

